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Abstract 
 
In this thesis the impact of R&D expenditures on firm market value and stock returns is 
examined. This is performed in a sample of European listed firms for the period 2000-
2009. I apply different linear and GMM econometric estimations for testing the impact of 
R&D on market prices and construct country portfolios based on firms’ R&D expenditure 
to market capitalization ratio for studying the effect of R&D on stock returns. 
The results confirm that more innovative firms have a better market valuation, 
investors consider R&D as an asset that produces long-term benefits for corporations. The 
impact of R&D on firm value differs across countries. It is significantly modulated by the 
financial and legal environment where firms operate. Other firm and industry 
characteristics seem to play a determinant role when investors value R&D. First, only 
larger firms with lower financial leverage that operate in highly innovative sectors decide 
to disclose their R&D investment. Second, the markets assign a premium to small firms, 
which operate in hi-tech sectors compared to larger enterprises for low-tech industries. 
 On the other hand, I provide empirical evidence indicating that generally highly R&D-
intensive firms may enhance mispricing problems related to firm valuation. As R&D 
contributes to the estimation of future stock returns, portfolios that comprise high R&D-
intensive stocks may earn significant excess returns compared to the less innovative after 
controlling for size and book-to-market risk. Further, the most innovative firms are 
generally more risky in terms of stock volatility but not systematically more risky than 
low-tech firms. Firms that operate in Continental Europe suffer more mispricing compared 
to Anglo-Saxon peers but the former are less volatile, other things being equal. The sectors 
where firms operate are determinant even for the impact of R&D on stock returns; this 
effect is much stronger in hi-tech industries.  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this Ph.D. dissertation is to study the impact of research and development 
expenditures (hereafter R&D) on stock market value, on the overall and systematic risk of 
this type of investment and on firm stock returns for a sample of European firms. In the 
last 30 years this topic has attracted the attention of numerous scholars all over the world. 
 The benefits of innovation in terms of sales growth, market value increase are drawn 
by the seminal work of Schumpeter (1934, 1942). He introduced the term “creative 
destruction” and postulated that the economic change revolves around innovation, 
entrepreneurial activities and market power and sought to prove that the innovation-
originated market power could provide better results than the invisible hand & price 
competition. Schumpeter argued that technological innovation often creates temporary 
monopolies, allowing abnormal profits that would soon be competed away by rivals and 
imitators; these temporary monopolies are necessary to provide the incentive necessary for 
firms to develop new products and processes (Schumpeter, 1942).  
Other studies in the following of the past century posit that knowledge management 
activities are fundamental for guarantying firm survival in the long term. Firms’ success 
depends on the availability of specific knowledge which is not possessed and difficult to be 
accomplished by other competitors (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Sicca, 1998; Sobrero and 
Torrisi, 2007). Firms’ intangible assets are superior to tangible ones because they contain 
the necessary requisites (knowledge) in order to have a sustainable advantage in the long 
term (Gabrielli, 2006). The key role of the intangibles for firms has inspired the knowledge 
based theory (Zack, 1999) which identifies in the creation, accumulation and use of 
knowledge the main functions of the modern firm (Krogh et al. 2000). 
Drawing on these theories there is a large body of research which considers knowledge 
management inside the firm as a key success factor which creates competitive advantage, 
and boosts firm performance. Many empirical studies have tried to capture the relation 
between innovation which is powered by knowledge and growth at a micro or a macro 
level. Firm growth is influenced or influences a set of other specific performance indicators 
like firm productivity, firm value and firm earnings. 
R&D is the main activity inside the firm which contributes to the creation and 
preservation of innovation. Hence, it’s the main input indicator that has been used in the 
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literature for testing the link between innovation and growth or innovation and firm 
performance. If we consider R&D as an input in the innovation creation process inside the 
firm, then there must be other output indicators that can be related and influenced by it. 
Prior research has individuated different firm level variables that can assume this role. 
These can be scientific publications from members of firm R&D department (Oriani, 
2004); number of registered patents (Hall et al. 2000), number of citations on the registered 
patents (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002); new products or processes, firm productivity or 
firm economic or financial performance. 
Griliches (1981) was one of the first authors that tried to measure the link between 
R&D as a proxy for innovation and firm performance by introducing a closed form model, 
the so-called hedonic model. It permitted to capture the value relevance of R&D, which 
creates intangible capital for the firm and thus positively impacts firm value. After 
Griliches (1981) several empirical studies have found that investors consider R&D 
expenditures as value relevant for the firm, which means that, when R&D is disclosed, it is 
associated with investors’ valuation of the firm and has a significant effect on firm’s stock 
price or firm performance (Wyatt, 2008). This literature in turn, includes two main strands: 
one focusing upon the impact of R&D on productivity (Griliches, 1995, Mairesse and 
Mohen, 1996; Hall, 2009) and the other on market valuation (Cockburn and Griliches 
1988; Chauvin and Hirschey, 1993; Hall, 1993b; Sougiannis, 1994; Stark and Thomas, 
1998; Toivanen et al. 2002; Conolly and Hirschey, 2005; Pindado et al. 2010).  
There is another research mainstream which has emphasized a significant relationship 
between R&D and expected stock returns (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Chan et al. 2001; 
Chambers et al. 2002; Dedman et al. 2009). This correlation has been attributed to a 
possible mispricing effect due to the failure of investors to correctly estimate the effects of 
R&D on the future firm cash flows or secondly, to a different risk-pattern of the 
investments in R&D compared to tangible assets. 
The difficulty in evaluating the present value of R&D investments can be due to 
different factors. R&D-intensive firms generally have few tangible assets, the future 
benefits from R&D programs are far from assured and cash flows from these projects are 
difficult to evaluate (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Chan et al. 2001; Kothari et al. 2002). This 
may lead to a problem of undervaluation of the net value of these expenditures if long term 
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benefits of R&D are not considered exhaustively, or overpricing, if investors inflate the 
market value of R&D-intensive firms being too optimistic about firm growth related to 
R&D activity (Al-Horani et al. 2003; Chiao et al. 2008). Second, under U.S. and 
International GAAP, R&D costs are completely expensed in the year when they are 
incurred, unless a clear connection between part of these costs and a hypothetic future 
product for sale can be demonstrated1. Investors can erroneously produce high multiples of 
these firms if they fail to correct accounting variables for long term benefits of R&D. They 
can also be misled by the past performance of stocks assigning excessive preference to past 
winners which can suffer momentum reversals in the future (Lakonishok et al. 1994; Chan 
et al. 2001).  
The risk-pattern approach draws from the seminal work of Fama and French (1992), 
which suggest that measures of firm size and book-to-market ratio (BM) are able to capture 
part of the firm’s risk that the CAPM is not able to explain. Other authors have evidenced 
in successive research that the overall predictive power of the Fama and French model 
increases when a R&D variable is added to it (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996). R&D projects 
may contribute sensibly to firm business risk or systematic risk in a way that may not be 
totally attributed to size and book-to-market ratio; hence, adjusting realized returns only 
for the former factors is unlikely to completely control for firm risk (Chambers et al. 
2002a).  
Recently, several contributions in the literature have tried to assess how the effect of 
the national financial and legal environment affects the market value of R&D investment. 
Innovation projects are the main drivers for firm growth, and the way they are financed and 
valued by investors may depend on the predominance of a direct or indirect intermediation 
model. The results on this topic are still not conclusive. Bae and Kim (2003) notice that the 
R&D impact on market value is stronger for a sample of Japanese firms compared to US 
firms, perhaps due to a “corporate myopia” typical of a market-based country where stock 
markets value positively short-term earnings compared to a bank-based country like Japan. 
However, Booth et al. (2006) provide evidence that the link between R&D and market 
value is stronger when the portion of equity financing in a country exceeds bank loan 
financing, and usually this happens in market-based intermediation systems. 
                                               
1 IAS 38 for European countries and SFAS 2 for the US. 
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The novelties of this study are mainly three: First, there is scarcity of research 
examining the effect of R&D on firm value for Continental Europe firms. The last two 
decades have witnessed a sensible growth of the number of firms which invest in R&D 
expenditures in these countries. Research and development is perceived as a strong value 
driver by European Institutions, local policy makers and corporations2. In 1995 the EU 
published the Green Paper on Innovation. It stressed the necessity that institutions in 
Europe should increment their capacity to invest in research and development. Moreover, 
the book enhanced the role of innovation for sustainable economic growth in the long term.  
In March 2010 the European Commission presented its ten-year strategy by promoting 
smart and sustainable growth for the Community members, Europe 2020. It followed the 
Lisbon Agenda (2000) whose adoption did not yield the desired outcomes. The new agenda 
puts innovation in the center of all economic policies for economic growth. All country 
members have agreed to raise the EU R&D ratio to GDP up to 3% for that year and to 
increase efforts for promoting R&D by private owned corporations. Actually, OECD 
statistics show that this ratio is below 2% in EU countries against 2.8% for the US and 
3.4% for Japan. Many countries including Italy actually invest less the 1.5% of their GDP 
in R&D, with a very low incidence of R&D from non-state owned corporations (Table 1 
and 2 in the Appendix).  
Second, I show in Section 4.1 that there exists a strong connection between R&D, 
sector R&D intensity, firm size and firm market value. Previous research has generally 
tested the impact of R&D on market value at the firm level after controlling for firm size 
and industry dummies (Chauvin and Hirschey, 1993; Booth et al. 2006). I follow a 
different approach, as I study the effect of industry on the value relevance of R&D by 
sorting firms in three groups according to their propensity to innovate. This variable is 
often used in the entrepreneurship literature for dividing industrial sectors in two regimes; 
the former is guided by creative destruction while the latter by creative accumulation. The 
first is characterized by technologies with high opportunities, low appropriability and low 
cumulativeness (Breschi et al. 2000). Industries subjected to this regime tend to have low 
barriers and new firms dominate the innovation activities of the industry. The other type is 
                                               
2 Lisbon Strategy (European Union agenda for promoting innovation, “learning economy” and social and 
environmental renewal in the EU) 
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characterized by creative accumulation technology. The experienced incumbent and larger 
firms have innovative comparative advantages compared to new entries. 
 I hypothesize that investors take into consideration the industry sector in a similar 
pattern when they have to assess the value relevance of innovation activities, which is 
indirectly related to the industry level of R&D intensity. Moreover, it seems that firm size 
modulates this relationship because smaller firms are more able to reap benefits from 
innovation in determinate sectors, while larger firms have more advantages in others. As 
far as I know, this issue had not been tackled in the previous literature. 
Third, to the best of my knowledge, this the first study that examines the impact of 
R&D on stock returns in European financial markets. I apply different models for testing 
whether in these countries there is a potential mispricing of R&D and whether this is due 
to systematic risk not accounted by other empirical models. 
The correct valuation of the R&D impact on stock returns across Europe can help 
investors to designing future investment strategies. It can also give managers and 
regulators useful insights on the long term benefits of R&D on stock prices and returns, 
which can be translated in more macroeconomic growth e social allocative efficiency. 
Moreover, the relationship between innovation and price variability is investigated together 
with the possibility that excess returns are due to industry sectors. 
In order to explore the impact of R&D in market value, in this study I adopt an 
accounting based model based on Edwards-Bell-Ohlson residual income model (Ohlson, 
1989). I extend this model for capturing various firm and country characteristics in order to 
analyze the relationship between R&D firm expenditures and the market value. The 
mispricing of R&D investment and the presence of excess returns in more innovative firms 
are studied by the Fama and French (1992, 1993) risk models which are also used for 
assessing the importance of R&D in predicting stock volatility. 
The results show that R&D is positively related to firm value, although this relationship 
is modulated by different firm and country factors like firm size, the industrial sector 
where firms operate and the legal and financial environment of the country of domicile. On 
the other hand I find that more R&D intensive firms experience generally higher returns in 
the future, higher variability which indicates that R&D investment is perceived as more 
risky by investors. However the results are not homogeneous across different countries. 
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The thesis is structured as follows: in Section 2 several issues related to firm R&D 
activity are explained. In section 3 the theoretical background for the different approaches 
is evidenced. In sections 4 and 5 the two main methodologies together with sample 
description and empirical evidence are presented. Conclusions and final remarks follow.  
  
14 
 
2. Considerations about research and development activities at the firm 
level 
2.1 Definition and delimitation of R&D activity 
Many authors have offered definitions and have tried to set some boundaries of R&D 
activity inside the firms. However, many of these definitions have proved to be 
questionable and arbitrary. For example, Gambardella (1995) considers R&D as the firm 
function which is specialized in the generation, development and experimentation of 
technological innovation. He focuses in the innovation process and assigns this function 
only to the R&D function inside the firm. However, there also other divisions inside the 
firm which can innovate and secondly, innovation is not merely technological (Piccaluga, 
1996). 
Actually, researchers refer to the Frascati Manual for R&D definition. It was 
published in 1964 e periodically revisited by the OECD. The manual contains 
recommendations about gathering data on R&D activity in OECD country members. 
According to this manual, R&D comprises creative work undertaken on a systematic basis 
in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and 
society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications. The term R&D 
covers three activities: basic research, applied research and experimental development. 
Basic research is experimental or theoretical work which is undertaken primarily to acquire 
new knowledge of the underlying foundation of the phenomena and observable facts, 
without any particular application or use in view. Basic research can be further on 
subdivided in pure basic research and oriented research. The former is carried out for the 
advancement of knowledge, without seeking long-term economic or social benefits or 
making any effort to apply the results to practical problems or to transfer the results to 
sectors responsible for their application. Oriented research is carried out with the 
expectation that it will produce a broad base of knowledge likely to form the basis of the 
solution recognized or expected, current or future problems or possibilities. 
Applied research is original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new 
knowledge. It is, however, directed primarily towards a specific practical aim or objective. 
Applied research is undertaken either to determine possible uses for the findings of basic 
research or to determine new methods or ways of achieving specific and predetermined 
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objectives. It involves considering the available knowledge and its extension in order to 
solve particular problems. In the business enterprise sector, the distinction between basic 
and applied research is often marked by the creation of a new project to explore promising 
results of a basic research program. 
The results of applied research are intended primarily to be valid for a single or limited 
number of products, operations, methods or systems. Applied research gives operational 
form to ideas. The knowledge or information derived from it is often patented but may be 
kept secret. 
Experimental development is systematic work, drawing on existing knowledge gained 
from research and/or practical experience, which is directed to producing new materials, 
products or devices, to installing new processes, systems and services, or to improving 
substantially those already produced or installed. R&D covers both formal R&D in R&D 
units and informal or occasional R&D in other units. In the social sciences, experimental 
development may be defined as the process of translating knowledge gained through 
research into operational programs, including demonstration projects undertaken for 
testing and evaluation purposes. 
Although the manual tries to set definite boundaries to different forms of research, it is 
difficult in practice for firms to correctly delimitate activities comprised in basic research 
and activities that can be defined as applied research. Small firms encounter difficulties in 
splitting costs and assigning them to the R&D voice. These can be payroll, overhead costs 
and costs for materials. These issues can influence the disclosure of R&D expenditures and 
the correct adoption of the accounting rules to them. 
 
 
2.2. The accounting regime of R&D expenditures  
Current economic literature considers R&D as a long-term investment that may 
generate benefits over multiple years. Hence, R&D should be treated as investment in plant 
and long-term equipment, capital expenditures (Lev and Sougiannis, 1999). However, it 
seems that this is not the rationale for accounting treatment of R&D in the USA, where, 
from 1974 it has been compulsory to write off all R&D expenses according to GAAP 
accounting rules, and also to completely disclose them for the benefit of investors. This is 
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due to the fact that regulators have the belief that the benefits deriving from R&D activity 
are highly uncertain and no bank would accept them as collateral in a borrowing contract 
like they normally do for tangible assets like plant and equipment (Damodaran, 2009).  
In Europe, the situation until 2004 has been somewhat more varied. The accounting 
rules were differentiated mainly between basic research on the one side and development 
expenses on the other. The former investments were generally expensed, whereas for 
development projects capitalization were allowed if certain conditions were met; these 
basically concerned the possibility that the firm could demonstrate a link between the 
expenses and a marketable product or service.  
Accounting systems in Europe are different from one another and inspired by different 
social and historical foundations. France and Germany practice code-law and have a 
“macrouniform, government-driven and tax-dominated” accounting system (legal 
compliance model), whereas the accounting system in the UK is more “micro, fair, 
judgmental and commercially driven” (Zhao, 2002). Empirical studies have provided 
evidence that accounting earnings have higher quality in common-low than code-law 
countries (Ball et al. 1998). 
 R&D accounting in Germany is inspired by a desire for prudential accounting, which 
is related to the importance of banks in the German system. Banks are major stakeholders 
in almost every big listed corporation. The law does not require the disclosure of R&D, but 
only “recommends” it. German tax authorities are very reluctant to permit R&D 
capitalizing even when future benefits could be clearly defined, as they are inspired by a 
prudential accounting policy.  
In Sweden, companies rarely disclosed R&D expenditures before the 1990s. However, 
under strong pressure from trade unions the situation changed during the last years of the 
20th century, when most firms began to disclose their investment in R&D. The accounting 
rules in Sweden are driven by a strong commitment to taxation policy, so capitalization is 
strongly discouraged, except under stringent and almost impossible conditions. 
In the UK there was no requirement until 1989 for companies to disclose their 
expenditures in R&D, so many did not. After 1985 a general debate took place concluding 
with the adoption of the SSAP 13 in 1989. This accounting principle recommended the 
disclosure of R&D for firms meeting certain size thresholds. Stoneman and Toivanen 
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(2001) provide evidence that the adoption of SSAP 13 produced a large increase in the 
disclosure of R&D expenditures for all classes of firms. The accounting treatment of R&D 
requires the complete expensing of basic research and permits capitalization of 
development expenditure if certain circumstances are met. 
Since 2005, all European listed firms have adopted the IAS - IFRS accounting 
principles for their financial statements, in an effort towards harmonization of accounting 
treatments across the continent. Under this perspective, there have been few changes for 
basic research costs, which continue to be totally expensed. Development expenditures can 
still be capitalized, but now this rule is somewhat more detailed, as the firm should provide 
proof that this expense creates an intangible asset that will produce specific goods or 
services available for sale (IAS 38.57). Due to the difficulty of the application of this rule, 
there is evidence that listed firms completely expense R&D in the year it is incurred 
(Damodaran, 2009). Disclosure has still not become compulsory (Hall and Oriani, 2006). 
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3. Theoretical background 
3.1. The impact of R&D on firm market value, the hedonic model  
The hedonic model stems from the seminal works of Griliches (1981) and others. The 
main advantage of the model is that it doesn’t require for researchers to directly measure 
the benefit of the investment in R&D in terms of economic performance (earnings growth) 
or a specific output (firm total productivity). This could be difficult in practice because 
first, data would not cover a long enough time in order to enable precise measurement of 
the total effect. Second, occasionally long and uncertain lags between the investment in 
innovation and its output would mean that a researcher might have to wait a certain amount 
of time to see the effects in firm productivity (Hall, 2000). Instead, the model relates the 
valuation placed by the financial markets on a firm’s assets to its R&D expenditure. This 
relies on the fact that listed companies are considered bundles of assets (tangibles and 
intangibles), whose values are determined every day by financial investors. In equilibrium, 
the market valuation of any asset results from the interaction between firms’ demand for 
investment and the market supply of capital for that specific asset (Hall and Oriani, 2006). 
The market value can be represented as a linear function of its assets:	 
 
௜ܸ௧ = ܸ(ܣ௜௧,ܭ௜௧ , ܫ௜௧) 
 
where Ait is the book value of tangible assets, Kit is the replacement value of the firm’s 
technological knowledge and Iit is the replacement value of the other intangible assets. If 
we consider assets as purely additive, the market value of the firm can be expressed as a 
linear function of these assets: 
 
௜ܸ௧ = ݍ௧(ܣ௜௧ + ߛܭ௜௧ + ߣܫ௜௧)ఙ 
 
where qt is the average market valuation coefficient of a firm’s total assets (reflecting the 
differential risk and monopoly position of the firms in the sample) and sigma are returns to 
scale (which usually are assumed equal to one). So the hedonic model treats the firm as a 
good whose characteristics are its tangible and intangible assets. In the log form the 
previous model can be expressed as:  
(1) 
(2) 
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 log	(௏೔೟
஺೔೟
) = logݍ௧ + ݈݋݃(1 + ߛ ܭ௜௧ ܣ௜௧ + ߣ ܫ௜௧ ܣ௜௧⁄⁄ ) 
 
The ratio Vit/Ait can be assumed as a proxy for Tobin’s q, the ratio of the market value 
of tangible assets to their physical value (Hall and Oriani, 2006). This equation permits to 
value the impact of a euro invested in innovation on the market value of the firm at a 
certain point in time.  
The initial empirical results from adopting this approach were originated from US data. 
This was due to the fact that US accounting principles from 1974 required a complete 
expensing and disclosure of R&D investment, so there exists a broad database and highly 
efficient financial markets that have permitted highly significant inference. The seminal 
work of Griliches (1981) was followed by other contributions like Pakes (1985) which 
finds that unexpected changes in R&D are associated with large changes on the market 
value of the firm. Jaffe (1986) evidences that firms that invest intensively in R&D, 
experience greater benefits in terms of market value if they operate in sectors which are 
also R&D intensive. Cockburn and Griliches (1988) show an interaction between 
effectiveness measures of the innovation appropriability regime and the market valuation 
of the firm’s R&D share, confirming that it significantly affects the expected returns from 
the R&D activity. Hall (1993a and 1993b) finds that the effect of R&D on stock market 
value fell sharply during the decade 1980-1990 due to different factors like the fall of 
private rate of return to R&D capital, the increase of the depreciation rate of R&D assets, 
more myopic financial markets which discounted R&D at a much higher rate or the 
takeover era which took place during the ‘80ies. Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) provide 
evidence that R&D and advertising have positive and consistent influence on the market 
value of the firms especially for high-tech firms. Megna and Klock (1993) continue the 
exploratory analysis of Cockburn and Griliches (1988), looking for complementary 
information to determine whether the measures of intangible capital contribute 
significantly to the change in Tobin's q. They focus on the semiconductor segment of the 
electronics industry and the strategic importance that intangible capital assumes in this 
area. Their findings, analyzing eleven registered companies in the Compustat database for 
the period 1972-1990, suggest that intangible capital contributes to the change in Tobin's q, 
(3) 
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but substantial differences remain in the q ratio in the reference field, as shown by the 
firm-specific effects. The stock of R&D and the stock of patents have a positive and 
significant impact. 
Outside the US this model has been used for British data because even in the UK from 
1989 accounting rules imposed firm to expense R&D in the year it was incurred with few 
exceptions for development expenditures (Stark and Thomas, 1989). Stoneman and 
Bosworth (1994) estimate a model very similar to that of Hall (1993b) using a balanced 
panel of 180 UK companies over the period 1984-1992. The main difference is the 
omission of advertising expenses and the use of the variables for patents and investment in 
physical capital. The results suggest that R&D and patents have a positive impact on 
market value, in general, with R&D affecting it more strongly than patents. Toivanen et al. 
(2002) realize a cross-section and panel analysis of a set of UK listed companies for the 
period 1989-1995. The two techniques show a positive and statistically positive coefficient 
for the R&D expenditure, but it widely varies without a specific trend from year to year, in 
contrast to what was observed by Hall (1993b) for U.S. firms. 
Blundell et al. (1999) examine the relationship between technological innovations, 
market share and market value of 340 listed companies in the United Kingdom from 1972 
to 1982. They find a positive and significant effect of market share on the number of 
commercialized innovations and patents, although they note that more competition in the 
industry tends to stimulate innovative activity. In addition, they find that the innovation 
impact on market value is greater for firms with higher market shares.  
Hall and Oriani (2006) adopt the hedonic model for a cross-country comparison of the 
market valuation of R&D. The results evidence a positive and a robust valuation of R&D 
by the stock market for the German and French samples although the valuation of the R&D 
investments in the cross section is substantially greater for UK firms. From the perspective 
of the financial investors, this means that a currency unit spent in R&D by a company in 
the United Kingdom has on average an impact whose magnitude is nearly three times 
bigger than in France and Germany. However the paper evidences how the markets value 
R&D less than the unity and the trend has been decreasing over time.  
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3.2 The impact of R&D on firm market value, the accounting-based model  
The accounting-based model derives from the contributions of Ohlson (1989, 1995) 
and others. It is based on the classical valuation model which reveals equity price to be the 
present value of future abnormal earnings (Rees, 1997). According to this model:  
 
ܯ ௜ܸ,௧ = ܤ ௜ܸ,௧ + ∑ ܧ൫ܴܫ௜,௧ାఛ൯/∏ (1 + ݇௜,௧ା௡)ఛ௡ୀଵஶఛୀଵ  
 
Where MVi,t is the market value of firm i at time t, BVi,t is the book value of firm i at 
time t, RIi,t+τ is the residual income of firm i at time t+τ, ki,t+n is the risk-adjusted cost of 
capital for firm i at time t+n and E ( . ) is the expectations operator. The main novelty of 
the model is that the present market value is a function of current book value plus the 
present value of expected abnormal income (Green at al. 1996). As expectations about 
residual income are formed at time t, we have: 
 
, , , , 1( )i t i t i t i tRI k BV    
Where πi,t is a measure of income (operating earnings after taxes usually). After 
assuming that future residual incomes can be modeled as declining at a rate δ > 0, we can 
model them as:  
 
෍ܧ൫ܴܫ௜,௧ାఛ൯/ෑ(1 + ݇௜,௧ା௡)ఛ
௡ୀଵ
ஶ
ఛୀଵ
= 1 − ߜ
݇ + ߜ ܴܫ௜,௧ 
This is consistent with competitive markets where the initial advantage which permits 
in the beginning earning rates superior to the cost of capital k, is eroded at a fixed rate. 
The right hand of equation (4) expresses the value in excess of book value of assets in 
place. Previous research has evidenced that the impact of R&D on market value can be 
reflected indirectly through earnings (Sougiannis, 1994). Past R&D expenditures have a 
significant effect in explaining residual income because they influence the tangible 
investments made by the firm. Only current R&D expenditures influence the present firm 
market value once we include in the equation the residual income variable. The latter 
captures the effect of past R&D expenditures that are currently producing benefits for the 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
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firm via the existing assets. These arguments suggest a modification of the basic residual 
income model:  
 
ܯ ௜ܸ,௧ = ܤ ௜ܸ ,௧ + ߚܴܫ௜,௧ + ߛܴܦ௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ 
 
Usually all variables in the above model are scaled by a size variable like the 
replacement value of total assets in order to avoid heteroskedasticity problems (Pindado et 
al. 2010). Other deflators have also been used like sales (Hirschey, 1985), number of 
shares (Rees 1997), opening market value (Lo and Lys, 2000), closing market value (Stark 
and Thomas, 1998). Rearranging, the final residual income model would be the following:  
 
(ܯ ௜ܸ,௧ − ܤ ௜ܸ,௧)/ܤ ௜ܸ,௧ = ߚܴܫ௜,௧/ܤ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߛܴܦ௜,௧/ܤ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ 
 
Further extensions of the model by other researchers have substituted the residual 
income variable with earnings before exceptional and extraordinary items. Dividends have 
also been added due to their signaling role (Bhattacharya, 1979). Akbar and Stark (2003) 
introduce the concept of net shareholders cash flows which comprise net dividends to 
shareholders and capital contributions from them. So, a new version of the accounting-
based model after deflating all variables by closing book value of assets in order to reduce 
heteroskedasticity would be the following (Hughes, 2008):  
  
(ܯ ௜ܸ,௧ − ܤ ௜ܸ,௧)/ܤ ௜ܸ,௧ = ߚଵܧ௜,௧/ܤ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߚଶܴܦ௜,௧/ܤ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߚଷܦ௜,௧/ܤ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߚସܥܥ௜ ,௧/ܤ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ 
 
Where Ei,t are earnings of firm i at time t, Di,t are firm dividends for year t, CCi,t are 
capital contributions from shareholders and stock buybacks. 
Previous research has applied these models mainly on UK data. Green et al. (1996) 
collect data for UK listed firms for years 1990, 1991 and 1992. The results do not show a 
convincing significance of the R&D variable on firm market value. The R&D coefficient is 
positive and significant at the 5% level for 1990 and significant at the 10% level for 1991 
and 1992. Stark and Thomas (1998) provide stronger evidence; they do not restrict the 
sample as Green et al. (1996) only to firms which report R&D expense. The results are 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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much more positive in favour of the value relevance of R&D expense, with the coefficients 
on all the annual cross-sections and the pooled data being positive and significant at the 
5% level. Furthermore, the actual increases in explanatory power associated with the 
addition of R&D expense into the firm value equation are sizeable enough to be noticed 
not merely statistically. 
Akbar and Stark (2003) use all non-financial UK firm-year observations for which data 
is available from 1990 to 2001. Estimates of the R&D loading in pooled cross-section 
regressions are significant for all deflators (book value, sales, number of shares and 
opening book value). The empirical results support the hypothesis that the capital markets 
treat R&D expenditures as a long term investment.  
Hughes (2008) uses a sample of UK firms for the period 1990-2005. She finds a 
significant positive effect of R&D on firm market value after correcting the model for 
endogeneity problems which are relevant in panel data. Dedman et al. (2009) confirm the 
previous results with respect to the value relevance of research and development. The 
coefficients for R&D are positive and significant. They are also robust to the choice of the 
deflator. 
Booth et al. (2006), Pindado et al. (2010), Duqi et al. (2011) and Appolloni et al. 
(2011) offer some preliminary evidence that R&D can be considered value-relevant even 
in Continental Europe. They use sample of European firms and modulate the R&D effect 
by control variables like firm size, firm free cash flows, growth rate of equity and loan 
markets. The empirical results show that the R&D effect is always positive and strongly 
significant. 
  
 
3.3 The potential mispricing effect of R&D on stock returns 
 Although the aforementioned contributions evidence that R&D is value relevant there 
are also many studies which report that R&D is often mispriced by investors. They fail to 
correctly price the benefits of R&D on stocks’ future cash flows causing a share over- or 
undervaluation.  
The mispricing effect can be due to the failure by investors to correctly value the long 
term benefits of R&D or to their failure to correct their discount rate when valuing these 
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expenditures. The first error mainly is due to accounting rules while the second concerns 
the non-diversifiable risk pattern of R&D. 
Under U.S. and International GAAP, R&D costs are completely expensed in the year 
when they are incurred, unless a clear connection between part of these costs and a 
hypothetic future product for sale can be demonstrated. The potential mispricing role of 
different accounting regimes has been subject of a long debate among researchers. This 
issue followed the compulsory disclosure and complete expensing of R&D in the US from 
1974 and in the UK from 1989. As pointed out before, it is common belief that parts of 
R&D should be capitalized due to their similarity with long term assets. Following this 
approach some studies have suggested that financial reporting can be improved in favour 
of a less conservative policy that requires R&D costs to be capitalized (Lev and Zarowin, 
1999). This policy change, it is argued, would make summary accounting measures such as 
earnings and net assets more comparable across R&D-intensive and non-R&D-intensive 
firms, and therefore more useful to investors. 
Empirical evidence from US and UK firms suggest that capitalizing and amortizing 
does help in explaining share prices. Aboody and Lev (1998) examine accounting options 
in the US software industry which permit the capitalization of some costs. They report that 
these capitalized costs are correlated with equity values conditional on other elements of 
reported earnings and book values, again suggesting that managers may use their discretion 
to improve financial reporting. However their results are not conclusive as, they find that 
only 25% of software development costs are capitalized.  
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) report that, after controlling for reported accounting 
numbers, incremental R&D asset and amortization expense measures constructed from the 
publicly available history of R&D expenditures are cross-sectionally correlated with 
observed share prices. Chambers et al. (2002b) find that capitalizing and amortizing R&D 
costs is capable in principle of producing economically significant financial reporting 
benefits. Their results also suggest that realizing these benefits will require granting 
substantial discretion to managers over the choice of costs to be capitalized and the rate at 
which these costs are expensed. As a result, these benefits will depend on the extent to 
which managers have incentives to use this discretion opportunistically, and the ability of 
25 
 
corporate governance mechanisms and the audit process to place reasonable bounds on 
such behavior. 
Kothari et al. (2002) find that R&D investments generate more uncertain future 
benefits compared to capital expenditures. The coefficient on current R&D expenditures is 
about three times that of the coefficient in current capex. Givoly and Shi (2008) observe 
that capitalization is associated with lower underpricing of the stock on the first day of 
trading. The authors interpret this as evidence that capitalizers are subject to less 
uncertainty about the success of their software investments. 
Oswald (2008) studies how the choice of capitalizing versus expensing is associated 
with the value-relevance of book value and earnings for a sample of UK. He adjusts firm 
accounting earnings to reflect what they would have been if capitalization of development 
expenditures had been adopted. The results suggest that firms’ exercise of discretion over 
the accounting treatment of development expenditures are consistent with the notion that 
firms acted to increase the value relevance of earnings and book value. 
Reassuming, many authors have tried to assess if investors consider R&D expenditures 
as an asset or a simple annual cost. Sougiannis (1994), Lev and Sougiannis (1996), Hall 
(2000) among others point out that this is the case. The question whether there is 
mispricing or not due to annual expensing remains an opened question. Chambers et al. 
(2002b) suggest that permitting more discretion allows managers to give more information 
to the market thus allowing better allocation efficiency. However, the evidence by now 
does not permit to say that capitalizers perform better in terms of market share than 
expensers. Moreover, there is some recent research that evidences how the choice to 
capitalize or expense is due to the R&D growth rate relative to firm profitability (Lev et al. 
2005). They find that companies with a high growth rate of R&D relative to their 
profitability (typically, early life-cycle companies) report conservatively (expense R&D), 
while firms with a low R&D growth rate relative to profitability (mature companies) tend 
to report aggressively (capitalize R&D). The authors find misevaluation evidence which is 
consistent with well-established behavioral finance findings and, in particular, with the 
heuristic of representativeness that makes investors view patterns in reported data as 
representative about future patterns and thus overreact.  
**************************************************************** 
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The risk-pattern approach draws on the seminal work of Fama and French (1992). 
Their paper aimed to test the validity of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972). The authors begin with assessing that this 
model does not explain stock returns and it contains several contradictions. The first one is 
the size effect first indicated by Banz (1981). He finds that market equity (ME) adds to the 
explanation of the cross section of average returns provided by market βs. It seems that 
returns on small stocks are too high given their β estimates, while returns on large stocks 
are too low. Bhandari (1988) reports that average returns are related to leverage too, 
although this source of risk should be captured by market β. Stattman (1980), Rosenberg et 
al. (1985) and Chan et al. (1991) find that average returns on US and Japanese stocks are 
positively related to the ratio of a firm’s book value of common equity to its market value. 
Basu (1983) show that earnings price ratios (E/P) help explain the cross section of average 
returns on US stock even when size and β are included in the regression.  
Drawing from these “anomalies” of the CAPM, Fama and French (1992) build an 
empirical model for capturing different sources of risk that are not captured by β estimates 
for years after 1963. They include in this model a proxy for size (Market capitalization, 
ME), book-to-market ratio (BM), earnings to price ratio (E/P) and leverage (Assets to book-
value of equity, A/BE). After offering empirical evidence that beta cannot explain stock 
returns when stocks are grouped by pre-ranked betas, they show that the new added 
variables are strongly significant in predicting share returns. So, size negatively impacts 
stock returns as bigger firms usually are less risky than smaller ones. The book-to-market 
ratio captures the distress risk of the firm and is strongly related to firm economic 
fundamentals. High BM firms (a low share price relative to book value of equity) tend to 
have low and persistent earnings on assets, while low BM firms are associated with high 
earnings. 
After Fama and French (1992), a broad literature is developed which aims to test size 
and especially the book-to-market ratio as predictors for future returns assuming that if 
assets are priced rationally, variables like those must proxy for sensitivity to common risk 
factors in returns. Fama and French (1993) bring forward this approach and identify three 
main factors that are able to explain the future excess stock returns, i.e., a market factor 
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(β), a size variable (SMB) and a book-to-market variable (HML). Firms with high BM 
ratios tend to have low and persistent earnings on assets. 
The book-to-market effect is also related to value and growth investing strategies. 
There is evidence that value strategies (based on high BM, low E/P stocks) outperform 
growth strategies (low BM, high E/P stocks). This is carried out by “contrarian” investors 
which bet against “naïve” strategies that tend to overreact to good news and bad news. 
Naïve investors tend to get overly-excited about stocks that have done very well in the past 
so these glamour stocks get overpriced (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). Lakonishok et al. 
(1994) offer more empirical support to this point of view. They use a sample of US firms 
from 1963 to 1990 and find that value stocks outperform growth stocks due to a persistent 
overestimation of future earnings of glamour stock by investors relative to value stocks. 
They do not find any different risk pattern among the two classes of stocks. 
Fama and French (1995, 1996) provide an economic foundation to their three factor 
model. The rationale is that if stocks are priced rationally then size and book-to-market 
patterns in returns must be explained by the behavior of earnings. They find that high BM 
firms tend to be distressed and they have low ratios of earnings to book values of equity for 
at least 11 years around portfolio formation. Low BM stocks instead, are associated to 
strong and persistent earnings. Again, the authors offer evidence that the “contrarian” 
model offer by Lakonishok et al. (1994) can be explained by the three factor model (Fama 
and French 1996).   
 Following these contributions, a number of subsequent studies examine the effect of 
the BM ratio on stock prices even outside the US. The results are not univocal. Kothari and 
Schanken (1997) find a positive link in a time-series pattern between BM and future stock 
returns. Pontiff and Schall (1998) find that the predictive ability of the book-to-market 
ratio is related to the ability of book value to forecast future cash flows. They assess that 
the BM ratio can be a proxy of a discount rate. Same results are evidenced by Clubb and 
Naffi (2007) for the UK market. However Gregori et al. (2001) provide evidence for the 
UK that when portfolios are formed in a two-way classification (size and BM) the Fama 
and French (1993) model does not explain all the variation in cross-section returns. 
 ****************************************************************** 
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The evidence offered mainly for US and UK data suggests that the CAPM alone cannot 
explain several anomalies observed in stock returns. Size and book-to-market ratio seem to 
add strength to predictive models; investing strategies based on underperforming stocks 
like high BM stocks seem to gain abnormal returns not justified by the classic market 
model. Inspired by the new risk-approach introduced by Fama and French (1992, 1993) 
other authors have opened a new point of view based on intangibles and especially R&D. 
These studies assess that introducing a measure of R&D in the Fama and French model 
helps in predicting future stock returns. The main reason seems to be that R&D is a new 
non-diversifiable source of risk and if investors do not consider it properly, stock prices 
could be under or overvalued. In their seminal paper, Lev and Sougiannis (1996) find that 
when a measure of R&D stock is included in the Fama and French model, the model’s 
overall predictive ability of future stock returns greatly increases. The authors give an 
interesting explanation of this fact in Lev and Sougiannis (1999). It seems that the book-to-
market ratio, which is a corner stone in Fama and French (1992, 1993) captures all the firm 
growth options, and thus it might be substituted by a measure of R&D stock, which is a 
primary driver of innovation and thus, firm growth. Low BM companies usually are R&D 
intensive and high BM ones have low R&D investment. The return premium that investors 
ask is sensibly higher for basic research, which is more risky than development 
expenditures, indicating a clear compensation for higher risk in R&D projects.  
Chan et al. (2001) consider a sample of US firms for the period 1975-1995 and they 
find no evidence of mispricing for high-R&D firms compared to low-tech ones. Their 
results do not support a direct link between R&D spending and future stock returns. 
However when they measure R&D intensity relative to the market value of equity, the 
most innovative stocks perform significantly better than the less innovative. The authors 
argue that this performance may be due to the fact that RD/ME highly ranked stocks 
generally tend to be past losers, whose managers are optimistic about the firm’s future 
prospects. Financial markets tend to be sluggish in revisiting their past expectations.  
The mispricing pattern is defended also by papers which study unexpected changes in 
R&D investment or new R&D program announcements. Chan et al. (1990) study the 
stocks’ response to 95 announcements of increased R&D. High-technology firms that 
announce increases in R&D spending experience positive abnormal returns on average, 
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whereas announcements by low-technology firms are associated with negative abnormal 
returns. Moreover, in cross-sectional analyses they find that firms with higher R&D 
intensity than the industry average experience larger stock-price increases only for high-
tech industries. Eberhart et al. (2004) examine a sample of US firms in the period 1951-
2001, which unexpectedly increase their R&D expenditures by a significant amount. The 
authors find consistent evidence of a misreaction, as manifested in the significantly 
positive abnormal stock returns that the sample firms’ shareholders experience following 
these increases. They also find consistent evidence that sample firms experience 
significantly positive long-term abnormal operating performance following their R&D 
increases. These results suggest that R&D increases are beneficial investments, and that the 
market is slow to recognize the extent of this benefit which is proof of investor under-
reaction. 
Chambers et al. (2002a) admit that there exists a potential mispricing of R&D 
expenditures but this occurs because investors fail to correctly value long term benefits of 
R&D. R&D intensive firms have excess returns that persist over time after controlling for 
size and BM ratio; these returns have a higher level of variability compared to firms that 
are not R&D intensive. The investors do not take into consideration the different riskiness 
of R&D firms. 
Outside the US, the correct valuation of R&D has been studied for the UK market by 
Al-Horani et al. (2003) and Dedman et al. (2009). The former present evidence that the 
cross-section of UK expected stock returns is positively related to R&D activity, after 
controlling for size and BM effect. Dedman et al. (2009) extend the work of Al-Horani et 
al. (2003) studying the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) in cross-industry 
portfolios. The effect of the R&D variable has a positive effect on stock returns for 13 out 
of 20 industrial portfolios, evidencing that it can be a useful factor in pricing assets. They 
also confirm that investors are not misled by the fact that R&D expenditures are expensed 
in the year when they are incurred, because they consider R&D as an asset. Moreover, the 
RD/ME ratio can subsume the BM ratio as Lev and Sougiannis (1999) predict. 
Recently, Ciftci et al. (2011) take into consideration a very large sample of US stocks 
with positive R&D from 1979 through 1997. They sort firms in two groups according to 
their R&D industry benchmark intensity, low R&D-intensive and high R&D-intensive 
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firms. First, they find that high R&D firms have lower return variability. This is consistent 
with the fact that top innovators mitigate the risk of research by diversifying their R&D 
investments even through joint ventures and alliances (Szwejczewski et al. 2006). Second, 
high R&D-intensive firms earn excess returns in the short term, whereas low R&D firms 
do not. In the long term returns of both groups converge, reflecting common business and 
information risk factors. This indicates a mispricing problem for the top group. In 
summary, high industry-adjusted R&D intensive firms suffer from undervaluation in the 
short term, but they can mitigate this pattern if managers decide to disclose sensible 
information about the long term benefits of R&D projects.  
Xu and Zhang (2004) and Nguyen et al. (2010) find no evidence of abnormal returns 
related to R&D effect for Japanese firms; they find no undervaluation of R&D investments 
except for the post-bubble period (1993-2000). Chiao and Hung (2005) and Chiao et al. 
(2008) study the Taiwan stock market; they highlight an evident mispricing of R&D 
expenditures, which persists for up to three years, especially for firms operating in the 
electronics sectors. 
 
 
3.4 The moderating role of other variables in the market valuation of R&D 
The market valuation of R&D can be modulated by several firm and country 
characteristics. For example, prior literature has always assessed the importance of a firm’s 
size in performing innovation and in the market valuation of R&D investment. This 
coincides with the Schumpeterian view suggesting that larger firms are more able to 
perform R&D investment for several reasons (Schumpeter, 1939). R&D projects are risky 
and larger firms are more able to secure funds for financing these projects because size is 
related to internally generated cash flows (Schumpeter, 1942). Moreover, larger firms can 
better diversify their activities and can spread the risk over a large number of R&D 
projects, they can benefit from greater access to capital markets (Scherer and Harhoff, 
2000) or they have the possibility of achieving a long-run competitive advantage due to 
greater market power (Galbraith, 1952; Arrow, 1962). 
More recently, several authors have related the modulating effect of firm size to the 
impact of R&D on firm value. R&D should be better appreciated by financial markets for 
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larger firms as they can reap benefits from innovation more successfully than SME-s 
(Toivanen et al. 2002; Connolly and Hirschey, 2005).  
There are also contributions in the literature which cast doubts on the Schumpeterian 
view. They notive that among performers of R&D, the number of innovation outputs such 
as number of patents or amount of innovation per dollar of R&D decline with firm size 
(Bound et al. 1984; Pavitt et al. 1987; Acs and Audretsch, 1990, 1991; Van Dijk et al. 
1997). A very low rate of hierarchical governance structure and a less bureaucratic 
environment allow a higher responsiveness to innovative opportunities by small firms and 
new entrants in the market (Link and Bozeman, 1991).  
Firm market share is hypothesized to be another important factor for moderating the 
effect of R&D on firm value but this relationship remains controversial. Blundell et al. 
(1999) posit that dominant firms tend to have higher rates of R&D and innovate more. 
Firms with higher market share tend to commercialize more innovative products, thus 
benefiting more of the innovation process in terms of a better market valuation. Pindado et 
al. (2010) confirm these results; the higher the market share of the firm, the more effective 
the R&D spending and, therefore, the higher the market valuation. The authors justify this 
with the fact that R&D spending yields some supranormal profits for each dollar sold; 
hence, the overall benefits will be greater as the market share rises. However Toivanen et 
al. (2002) for a sample of UK firms find no evidence that firms with higher market share 
can better internalize the gains from R&D.  
The industrial sector is another relevant key variable when we deal with innovation and 
firm size. Some industries should take advantage of small firm innovation, while others 
foster innovation activity in large corporations (Ortega-Argilés et al. 2009). Cohen and 
Klepper (1996) suggest by theoretical and empirical evidence a modulating effect of the 
sector where firms operate for the R&D – size relationship. They posit that this relation is 
weaker for industries where innovations are more saleable, more product-driven than 
process-driven, and where prospects for rapid growth due to innovation are stronger. 
Other authors study this phenomenon from the point of view of technological 
trajectories (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Malerba and Orsenigo, 2000). Technological 
opportunities and appropriability conditions affect the dynamics of market structure and 
innovation investment (Levin et al. 1985; Cohen et al. 1990). It is thus plausible that larger 
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firms can better benefit from innovation in sectors with high entry barriers and lower 
technological opportunities, while smaller firms can succeed in entrepreneurial sectors 
(Ortega-Argilés et al. 2009). Acs and Audretsch (1991) find that hi-tech firms show no 
increasing returns to firm size in generating innovative output. They relate their results to 
the fact that firms operating in these sectors can benefit from small increments to existing 
knowledge in order to produce innovative output, while low-tech firms should invest in a 
substantial addition to the existing knowledge. 
Another strand of research draws from the seminal work of Himmelberg and Petersen 
(1994). In this paper, the authors offer empirical evidence that sector innovativeness is 
crucial even when firms’ financial constraints for investing in R&D are investigated. Small 
firms operating in hi-tech sectors are more likely to rely mainly on internal finance because 
they face financial constraints from outside investors. Bond et al. (1999) examine the cash 
flow sensitivity of investment in fixed capital and R&D for firms located in UK and 
Germany. They find that cash flow is not significant in explaining the propensity to invest 
in R&D in both countries. In the UK cash flow does matter more for the investment 
decisions in fixed capital for non-R&D firms than it does for R&D firms. These results 
indicate that hi-tech UK firms face a higher wedge between the costs of internal and 
external finance than German firms. UK firms experience more financial constraints when 
they have to finance long-term investments in R&D. In the same spirit, other important 
contributions study this topic for European countries (Bah and Dumontier, 2001; Muller 
and Zimmerman, 2008; Ughetto, 2008; Torluccio, 2008). 
In the literature, there have been few contributions which have connected the impact of 
R&D on market value with firm sector; these papers have concentrated on non-European 
data. Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) test R&D value relevance for US firms belonging to 
three commonly accepted hi-tech sectors and to three low-tech sectors. The results show 
that R&D coefficients are higher for the former group. Chiao and Hung (2005) find that 
electronics firms gain abnormal returns, compared to non-electronics firms, in the Taiwan 
context in the three-year period that follows new R&D announcements.    
The results from the contributions listed above show that the industry where firms 
operate is important when several issues related to firm R&D are investigated, such as the 
optimal firm size, in order to have the greatest benefits in the sector or financial constraints 
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related to highly innovative corporations. I extend this body of research by introducing the 
concept of sector innovativeness even for the market valuation of R&D expenditures. 
Some sectors are commonly considered as hi-tech by investors, regulators and policy 
makers. Firms that operate in these industries should invest heavily in R&D in order to 
operate competitively, because the sector R&D intensity is a threshold for firms’ efforts in 
this sense. I hypothesize that the impact of R&D on market value should be greater for 
these firms, compared to firms that operate in sectors that require a low rate of R&D 
intensity and low level of innovation. Firm size is connected to the industry as smaller 
firms should evidence a greater advantage in terms of a better market valuation of their 
R&D expenditures when they operate in hi-tech industries, while larger firms should be 
more able to benefit from R&D investment in low-tech sectors. 
The legal and financial environment where firms operate is another factor that may 
affect the stock market valuation of R&D expenditure. First, the role of equity and debt 
financing of R&D has been studied by different authors. Yosha (1995) and Bhattacharya 
and Chiesa (1995) argue that financial arrangements matter in R&D spending because of 
the potential for information leakage may lead to differences in the stock market’s 
response to R&D expenditures. Boot and Thakor (1997) posit that firms that rely on more 
complex technologies have more to gain from the feedback role of market prices and, 
therefore, should prefer financial markets, implying that the stock market reaction to R&D 
spending should be influenced by the characteristics of the financial system.  
Second, Demirgȕc-Hunt and Maksimovic (2002) show that the more developed a 
country’s loan and equity markets are, the stronger its growth will be. La Porta et al. (1998, 
2006) indicate that countries with a solid legal background and a high protection level of 
minority shareholders experience a more significant expansion of stock and credit markets. 
Empirical contributions supporting the agency theory problem point out that the R&D 
investment creates high information asymmetries that may encourage the expropriation of 
minority shareholders (Aboody and Lev, 2000). The presence of majority shareholders 
may induce investors to undervalue R&D projects (Hall and Oriani, 2006).  On the other 
hand, Tylecote and Ramirez (2006) find evidence that the presence of large and liquid 
shareholders such as pension funds, which are able to diversify in order to minimize risk, 
typical of market-based countries like UK and USA, makes investors biased towards short-
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term earnings. This might imply a bigger risk premium for projects with high R&D 
spending that rely on more distant cash flows. In the same direction, Munari et al. (2010) 
find that widely-held firms in market-based countries such as the UK undertake less 
investment in R&D because they fear a negative market valuation. 
Booth et al. (2006) build from these assumptions and conjecture that the way that 
equity investors value R&D expenditures depends not only on the extent to which the 
financial system in which the firm operates is developed but also on the relative 
importance of bank and public equity financing within the system. Financial investors are 
more prone to suffer information asymmetries about firm’s activities in the bank-based 
system than they are in the market-base one. Both systems are influenced by the degree of 
the legal environment as La Porta et al. (1998, 2006) evidence. The empirical results show 
that the market valuation of R&D is stronger when equity financing in a country increases 
compared to loan bank financing.  
R&D investment has a high degree of information asymmetries; insiders have usually 
more information about its potential outcomes in the long term (Aboody and Lev, 2000). 
These difficulties arise in countries where insiders can control big stakes of shares like in 
Continental Europe and where the private benefits of control are higher (Dyck and 
Zingales, 2004). Previous evidence for the US shows that generally investors are not able 
to correct their valuation of high R&D intensity stocks thus, generating abnormal returns, 
mispricing should be more pronounced in Europe where disclosure is more problematic 
due to accounting rules and practices. Investors in Europe could suffer information risk 
more than in Anglo-Saxon markets, because it increases in presence of relevant inside 
information and low disclosure. There is evidence that information risk significantly 
impacts asset pricing because uninformed investors will require a higher rate of return for 
holding stocks with higher rate of private information (Easley and O’Hara, 2002, 2004; 
Ciftci et al. 2011).  
We would expect that the stock variability of firms that invest more in R&D for 
Continental European firms is higher than non-R&D firms but lower than innovative firms 
domiciled in the UK other things being equal, because in Anglo-Saxon economies 
institutional investors put more pressure on managers and are more unwilling to accept 
short term losses which are frequent in hi-tech sectors (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006). They 
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might suffer from a so-called “myopic” view, which forces them to overreact by selling 
loser stocks and buying winners. In bank-based countries, inside shareholders are more 
inclined to accept long-term investments; they do not tend to calibrate frequently their 
portfolios following periodical information from firm managers, hence the stock volatility 
should be lower. Sias (1996) and Bushee and Noe (2000) provide empirical evidence that 
higher institutional ownership is associated with higher stock return variability. 
There is some evidence that in some European countries it may exist a size and book-
to-market effect but the results are still non conclusive. Fama and French (1998b) find that 
their model can explain stock returns in cross-country evidence even for European 
markets. Value stocks with high BM ratio outperform growth stocks in twelve out of 
thirteen international markets. Similar results are found for France by Lajili-Jarjir (2007), 
and Chahine (2008). Malin and Veeraraghavan (2004) do not reach the same outcomes 
comparing the UK with France and German markets. They evidence a small size effect in 
France and Germany, but no value effect for the markets investigated. 
Previous research have pointed out that mispricing of R&D could derive from a failure 
of investors to control for a non-diversifiable source of risk intrinsic of this asset that 
cannot be captured by other factors. The modulating effect of R&D in the Fama and 
French model (1993) for Continental European firms should not be different to that 
observed in the US or UK, due to similar risk characteristics of highly innovative firms in 
US and Western Europe. 
**************************************************************** 
The economic rationale deriving from the contributions listed in these sections supports 
the view that research and development should have a significant and positive effect on 
firm value and stock returns. This is hypothesized by the hedonic model that considers the 
firm as a bundle of tangible and intangible assets. The Tobin’s Q ratio is approximated by 
a log-linear function of these assets. The residual income model draws from the dividend 
discount model assumptions. The abnormal earnings are originated by the growth options 
that are entangled in current investments in innovation. This relationship is differently 
modulated by several firm characteristics like size, industry, market share, cash flow, firm 
age, firm growth and other features related to the financial environment where firms 
operate like corporate governance, loan and equity market development. 
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The effect of R&D on stock returns is somehow a more opened question. R&D 
investments are considered more risky than other firm tangible investments. Sometimes, 
investors fail to correctly price the benefits of these investments. This is reflected on 
underreaction or overreaction to new R&D announcements, mispricing in a short term or 
long term perspective, excess returns for R&D intensive stocks. This can be due to the 
investors’ inability to correctly control for extra risk in R&D projects or to the difficulty 
related to the accounting treatment of R&D. 
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4. The effect of R&D on firm value; the models, descriptive statistics and 
empirical results 
 
4.1 The residual income model 
A. The model, research questions and variables 
 In order to test whether R&D positively impacts firm value we use two accounting 
based models which are drawn from the seminal works of Ohlson (1989), Green et al. 
(1996), Stark and Thomas (1998). The models imply a linear approximation of firm value 
by a measure of earnings which reflects the profit deriving from the assets in place and a 
measure of the future growth opportunities for the firm which is represented by the current 
outlays in R&D. Earnings can be substituted by the residual income in a first version of the 
model or by operating profits in a second version. The latter comprises some important 
variables which can help improve its predictive power and will be explained below.  
 In the residual income model used in the present section, the firm value (FV) is related 
linearly to its book value (BV), residual income (RI), and R&D expenditure (RD). 
Generally, the book value of the year in progress (BV) is used as a deflator to permit the 
reduction of the scale effect. Other variables have been used in literature as deflators, such 
as sales, number of shares or opening book value (Hirschey, 1985; Rees, 1997; Lo and 
Lys, 2000). The basic model specification used is the following: 
 
    titititititi LEVMKTSHARESalesLnBVRDBVRIFV ,543,,2,,10, _    
 
where FVi,t = (MVi,t – BVi,t)/BVi,t. 
Similarly to Sougiannis (1994), Green et al. (1996), Toivanen et al. (2002), and Akbar 
and Stark (2003), only research and development costs that appear in the current year are 
considered; it is assumed that past expenditures have already produced tangible assets and 
are therefore reflected in the remuneration of these assets by the residual income.  
In accordance with previous studies (Green et al. 1996), firm market value of equity 
and debt at time t (MVi,t), is usually measured six months after the end of the financial 
(calendar) year. This choice has the advantage of identifying the level of market value 
when the financial statement has for some time been deposited and been available to 
(10) 
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investors, who will consequently have already absorbed the information in this document 
and acted on the stock market based on the various expectations created. The book value 
(BVi,t) is determined as the sum of the book value of equity plus reserves plus the firm’s 
debt value, which usually corresponds to its market value. 
The surplus profit or residual income is computed as the difference between the firms’ 
operating income and the book value of their assets multiplied by the cost of capital. The 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is calculated using as the risk-free rate the yield 
to maturity of Government bonds for each country. The rate of return of Government 
bonds with roughly an expiry date closest to 10 years was used as the risk-free rate of 
return. The research and development costs (RDi,t) are identified by the annual expenditure 
declared in each firm’s financial statement.  
Our main hypothesis supports the leading view in nowadays economic theory. R&D 
should positively influence firm value in European countries. As many contributions in the 
literature have highlighted, the relation between R&D and market value can be modulated 
by different firm features. We insert in the basic model some of these variables which have 
been used in prior research and whose role is supported by economic theories. 
The first variable is the companies’ market share, MKTSHARE. It is measured as the 
ratio between the sales of the company in year t (net sales) and net sales of firms in the 
same sector3. Blundell et al. (1999) have evidenced the positive impact that market share 
has in the market valuation of R&D. Firms with high market share should innovate more 
because the market share helps the leading firm to create entry barriers in the sector which 
enhance its market value (Pindado et al. 2010). I expect that the market share should have a 
positive effect on the market valuation of R&D. 
I include a control variable that I call LEV to control for firms’ financial structure. It is 
calculated as the ratio of the long and short-term debt to equity market value. Previous 
empirical evidence shows that financial leverage should not be preferred by firms that have 
a high propensity to innovate, as debt is more suitable for stable cash flows (Hall, 1992). 
High R&D-intensive firms should have highly volatile earnings, and intangible 
investments are not suitable for collateral in lending agreements with banks. The level of 
                                               
3 The industrial sectors were defined using the ICB sectors of the Industry Classification Benchmark from the 
FTSE - LSE Group UK 
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debt strongly influences the decision to finance innovative projects, especially for younger 
or smaller enterprises. In general, more innovative firms make more recourse to risk capital 
insomuch as the greater weight of intangibles entails more risks for external borrowers in 
terms of information asymmetries and moral hazard (Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994).  
The firm’s size effect is captured by including Ln_Sales which is the natural log of net 
sales. As already pointed out, firm size is considered a key point for the firm’s propensity 
to innovate and R&D intensity (Munari et al. 2010). According to economic theory and 
previous empirical outcomes, larger firms should experience a stronger effect of R&D on 
firm value. 
**************************************************************** 
The financial and legal environment of firms’ country of domicile has always attracted 
the attention of the researchers in economics because it is considered as one of the drivers 
that can boost or obstacle firm’s growth (Franks and Mayer, 1990; Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Hoskinsson et al. 2002; Booth et al. 2006; Munari et al. 2010; etc.). These studies address 
the question of different types of shareholder and firm performance but do not concentrate 
on the association between innovation, national differences in financial and legal systems 
and firm value. However other papers have tried to shed some light in the connection 
between country characteristics and economic growth (Demirgȕc-Hunt and Maksimovic, 
2002).  I test here whether investors differently value R&D in countries with different legal 
and financial background. The relation between market or bank-based financial systems 
and R&D has proved to be controversial. As I highlighted above, banks should not prefer 
to lend to high R&D intensive firms so in a bank-based system the impact of R&D on 
market value should be lower. However, market-based systems suffer somehow from a 
myopic view, they prefer short-term profits. Investors in these countries should consider 
high R&D expenditures as more risky and should negatively value the R&D impact on 
stock prices.  
Moreover, in countries like Germany, banks are key stakeholders in corporations; they 
do not have the emergency of short-term earnings like mutual funds typical of Anglo-
Saxon economies. The former might appreciate R&D investment because it could 
guarantee long-term benefits and leadership (Hall and Oriani, 2006). However, the legal 
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environment is a key driver for permitting a better disclosure of corporate information 
especially for sensible data like R&D projects. According to many authors (La Porta et al. 
1998, 2006 among others) this is more guaranteed in Anglo-Saxon financial markets which 
encourage transparency more than bank-based economies.  
The legal environment is represented by a variable constructed by La Porta et al. 
(1998).  This is a measure of shareholders’ protection, called ANT_DIR, which takes 
values from 1 to 6 according to a particular country, 6 being the best protection possible. 
This index is a combination of different variables: the first equals one if the country’s 
commercial laws give the opportunity to shareholders to vote by proxy; the second is equal 
to one if shares are required to be deposited before the shareholders’ meeting. The third 
variable equals one if in a country cumulative and/or proportional voting for directors is 
allowed. This should permit minority shareholders to put their representatives in the board. 
The fourth variable equals one if shareholders are granted certain rights to pursue directors 
in courts, or other measures which permit minority shareholders to tackle perceived 
oppression by directors. The fifth variable protects shareholders from dilution effects, 
giving them the option to buy new issues of stock before other interested investors. The 
sixth variable equals one if the percentage of share capital needed to call an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting is not too high (below 10 %). 
The level of financial development is captured by a variable constructed by Levine 
(2000). This is measured by the natural log of the product between the value of domestic 
equities traded on domestic exchanges divided by countrie’s GDP and the value of deposit 
money bank credits to the private sector as a share of GDP. I call this variable FIN_ACT. 
RD/BV is interacted with these categorical dummies in order to investigate whether or not 
they influence the impact of R&D on firm value. 
Finally, a dummy variable is included for considering the change in international 
accounting rules with the adoption of IAS-IFRS standards from 2005 onwards. This 
dummy, which I call IFRS, takes the value of 1 for observations in years 2005-2007 and 0 
otherwise. If the interaction of R&D with this dummy is significant, then the new rules can 
help in improving the market valuation of R&D. 
I extend the basic model for testing the importance of country variables. As usual, the 
closing book value of assets is used as a deflator. The model will be the following: 
41 
 
 
   
it
j
j
j
j
tititititi
COUNTRYYEARIFRSRD
ACTFINRDDIRANTRDBVRDBVRIFV






16
13
12
6
5
43,,2,,10,
*
_*_*
 
      
        
YEAR and COUNTRY comprise a set of time and country dummies for time and 
country specific effects, while εit is the error term. Then, I perform a different set of 
regressions via panel FE estimation, in which the interaction between RD/BV and firm 
market share is tested. In this case, the new interaction variable is named RD*MKTSHARE. 
The model will have the following pattern: 
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Finally the important role of the industry is considered by dividing the whole sample 
into three groups according to the sector innovativeness. This variable is incorporated in 
the model by three dummies, Dummy_hitech, Dummy_medtech and Dummy_lowtech. 
Industry sectors were sorted and divided into three groups based on R&D intensity over 
the period 2001-2007 (Table 3). Then, a dummy was assigned to every group.  
I include an interaction variable between RD/BV and Ln_Sales to the model (10) that I 
call RD_Sales, and run this model for every group-sector in order to verify a potential 
different modulating impact of firm size over the value relevance of R&D for different 
industries: 
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B. Sample selection 
The dataset comprises a sample of non-financial listed firms domiciled in Europe that 
operated continuously from 2001 to 2007. The firms under consideration performed 
research and development investment in each year. The initial data for R&D investment 
was provided by Eurostat statistics4 on the R&D expenditures of the Top 1000 firms in the 
EU area that invested the largest sums in R&D in the reported years (2001-2007). 
The European countries considered in this study are the UK, Germany, France, Sweden 
and Italy. I concentrated only on these countries because, in the annual survey carried out 
by the EU Industrial Scoreboard, the capitalization of companies listed in these nations 
constituted around 80% of the entire sample and the investment in R&D from these firms 
covered almost 75% of the total R&D expenditures. In order to have a more homogeneous 
sample, companies that were delisted or were subject to IPOs in that period were not 
considered. The missing data was integrated with other information extracted from 
Datastream and two other databases provided by Bureau van Dijk (OSIRIS, AMADEUS). 
Research on the firms’ financial statements was carried out for a final check. Finally, the 
sample was corrected for the presence of outliers by elimination of observations with 
negative values for the deflated variables, with the exception of the residual income which 
can be lower than zero. 
At the end of this process, the final sample comprised 416 companies: 136 of them were 
domiciled in the UK, 122 were German, 75 French, 53 Swedish and 30 Italian; with a total 
of 2884 firm-year observations distributed over the five countries. 
 
 
C. Descriptive statistics and empirical results 
In Table 1 descriptive statistics are exhibited for the most important variables across 
countries. There is a high variability of data, although some of the variables have been 
deflated to correct for the size effect. The dependent variable’s mean values are similar for 
French, German and UK firms (18.53, 20.5 and 16.93 respectively), showing a not 
dissimilar market capitalization for firms domiciled in these countries. On the other hand, 
Swedish firms’ stock values are higher on average, while the Italian ones are somewhat 
                                               
4 The 2008 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard. 
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smaller. Median values are, however, more similar, even for RI/BV and RD/BV in each 
country, indicating a high skewness in sample distribution. RI/BV ranges from 0.27 for 
Italy to 0.59 for the German sample; RD/BV ranges from 0.09 for Italy to 0.29 for Sweden, 
indicating little R&D spending for Italian firms, other things being equal. Considering that 
Ln_Sales median values are very similar for every country sample (the range is 12.54 to 
14.71), it may be the case that the capitalization of the Swedish firms benefits from very 
high price-to-book ratios compared to other firms in the sample. Previous contributions 
that have used the same model show smaller values for the same variables. For example, 
Green et al. (1996) consider a UK sample for years 1990-1992, and their median values for 
FV, RI/BV and RD/BV are respectively 0.82, 0.04 and 0.03 respectively.  
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Table 1 - Descriptive statistics by country, years 2001-2007 
This table provides descriptive statistics for main variables across countries for years 2001-2007. The number of firms is shown at the bottom of the table. 
FV = (MV-BV)/BV is the dependent variable. MV is the firm market value measured 6 months after the end of every financial year. BV is the firm book 
value of assets measured at the end of the financial year. RI is the firm residual income measured as RIi,t = (Ebiti,t – ki,tBVi,t-1). RD is the year firm 
expenditure in research and development. MKTSHARE is firm’s market share. LEV is the debt to equity ratio. Ln_Sales is the natural log of sales at the 
end of fiscal year. 
 
 
 France 
 
Germany 
 
Italy 
 
Sweden 
 
United Kingdom 
Variable Mean P5 Med. P95 Mean P5 Med. P95 Mean P5 Med. P95 Mean P5 Med. P95 Mean P5 Med. P95 
                         
FV 18.53 0.37 3.41 90.53  20.6 0.38 4.17 108.9  10.9 0.23 2.39 56.77  67.61 0.68 7.07 398.1  16.93 0.16 3.3 69.48 
RI/BV 1.49 -0.18 0.4 7.97  2.09 -0.24 0.59 12.88  0.75 -0.14 0.27 3.72  4.38 0 0.29 26.03  1.74 -0.27 0.37 10.06 
RD/BV 1.68 0 0.16 8.72  1.18 0.01 0.28 6.02  0.33 0 0.09 1.82  4.79 0.01 0.29 30.56  1.37 0 0.15 6.22 
MKTSHARE 0.15 0 0.02 0.73  0.12 0 0.01 0.48  0.04 0 0 0.2  0.33 0 0.04 0.77  3.6 0 0.01 0.29 
LEV 2.11 0.02 0.63 5.31  17.39 1.54 41.68 299  18.47 0.01 0.37 103.3  6.63 0.06 3.63 16.43  3.15 0.01 0.51 6.18 
Ln_Sales 13.77 9.21 13.74 17.61  13.39 9.92 13.16 17.7  13.75 10.9 13.32 17.74  14.66 10.97 14.71 18.27  12.61 8.5 12.54 16.69 
Obs. 75  122  30  53  136 
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In Table 2 a correlation matrix between the main variables is shown. There is a 
significant correlation between FV and the principal independent variables RD/BV and 
RI/BV (68.7% and 65.8%, respectively). Even RD/BV and RI/BV are well-correlated with 
each other (46.9%). The other variables show a weak correlation with one another and with 
FV, with the exception of Ln_Sales and MKTSHARE which are closely correlated 
(56.22%). 
 
Table 2 – Pearson correlation coefficients 
This table presents the coefficients of correlation for main variables. The sample consists of 416 non-
financial firms. FV = (MV-BV)/BV is the dependent variable. MV is the firm market value measured 6 months 
after the end of every financial year. BV is the firm book value of assets measured at the end of the financial 
year. RI is the firm residual income. RD is the annual firm expenditure in research and development. 
MKTSHARE is firm’s market share. LEV is the debt to equity ratio. Ln_Sales is the natural log of sales at the 
end of fiscal year.  
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 FV 1      
2 RD/BV 0.687* 1     
3 RI/BV 0.658* 0.469* 1    
4 Ln_Sales -0.151* -0.158* -0.075* 1   
5 MKTSHARE -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 0.562* 1  
6 LEV -0.015 -0.012 -0.015 0.031 -0.002 1 
 
Notes: * indicate 5% level of significance 
 
In Table 3 a breakdown of firm-year observations divided per sector for the period 
2001-2007 is presented. The most innovative industries are marked by a higher RD/Sales 
ratio. Theoretically, a higher R&D intensity implies higher innovation opportunities for the 
industry (Lin and Huang, 2008). In this sample, hi-tech firms have a R&D intensity rate 
that ranges from 8.77% for Technology Hardware & Equipment to 3.75% for Leisure 
Goods. The middle group R&D intensity ratio ranges from 3.71% to 1.40%. Finally, the 
less innovative firms have a maximum R&D intensity of 1.32% and a minimum value of 
0.12%. The hi-tech group comprises 1435 firm-year observations, the medium tech 916, 
and the low tech has only 513 observations during the period 2001-2007. This is due to the 
Industrial Scoreboard Survey which concentrates only on R&D performing firms that are 
more likely to pertain to highly innovative industries. The cut-off values for creating the 
sub-samples were chosen in order to have significant firm-year observations and also a 
significant number of industries for every group.  
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Table 3 – Distribution of firm-year observations per industry and for the period 2001-2007 
All firms for the total sample have been sorted in three groups based on sector innovativeness which is 
captured by R&D intensity. R&D intensity is the ratio of total R&D expenditures for the period 2001-2007 to 
total sales for the specific sector. ICB code and ICB sector are the industry classifications adopted by the 
FTSE-LSE Group (see Table 3 in the Appendix for sectors description). 
 
ICB Code ICB Sector Firm-year obs. R&D intensity 
Hi-tech    
9570 Technology Hardware & Equipment 126 8.77% 
4570 Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 347 7.83% 
2710 Aerospace & Defense 98 5.99% 
2730 Electronic & Electrical Equipment 287 5.96% 
3350 Automobiles & Parts 161 3.97% 
9530 Software & Computer Services 403 3.81% 
3740 Leisure Goods 13 3.75% 
Medium-tech    
4530 Health Care Equipment & Services 105 3.71% 
1350 Chemicals 147 3.64% 
2750 Industrial Engineering 287 3.45% 
3720 Household Goods & Home Construction 112 2.91% 
2720 General Industrials 56 2.80% 
5330 Food & Drug Retailers 21 2.72% 
3760 Personal Goods 70 2.28% 
3570 Food Producers 70 1.67% 
5550 Media 48 1.40% 
Low-tech    
6530 Fixed Line Telecommunications 48 1.32% 
2350 Construction & Materials 56 1.26% 
2790 Support Services 70 1.23% 
570 Oil Equipment Services & Distribution 31 1.19% 
1750 Industrial Metals & Mining 50 1.14% 
2770 Industrial Transportation 35 1.14% 
1770 Mining 32 1.07% 
5370 General Retailers 42 0.85% 
7530 Electricity 41 0.71% 
530 Oil & Gas Producers 35 0.32% 
7570 Gas Water & Multiutilities 35 0.28% 
3530 Beverages 23 0.17% 
5750 Travel & Leisure 35 0.12% 
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In order to test the value relevance of R&D an analysis via panel fixed-effects (FE) 
estimation is performed for every country (Table 4). All the models have been corrected 
for the presence of the heteroskedasticity of residuals, by running robust regressions 
(White, 1980). I decided to winsorize by 1% the top values for the main variables. As 
many variables are rightly skewed it would make little sense to winsorize even the bottom 
observations. A similar approach is followed by Dedman et al. (2009) for testing the value 
relevance of R&D in the UK market.  
 
Table 4 – Panel FE estimates of the relationship between FV and independent variables 
This table presents evidence between the dependent variable FV = (MV – BV) / BV and most important 
independent variables for every country sample. The number of observations for each country is listed at the 
bottom of the table.  MV is the firm market value measured 6 months after the end of every financial year. BV 
is the firm book value of assets measured at the end of the financial year. RI is the firm residual income. RD 
is the year firm expenditure in research and development. MKTSHARE is the firm’s market share. LEV is the 
debt to equity ratio. Ln_Sales is the natural log of sales at the end of the fiscal year. T-tests are shown in 
brackets below the parameter estimates. Year dummies have been included in every regression for time 
effects. R-squares and adj. R-squares are listed at the bottom of the table. 
 
 FR GR IT SW UK 
      
RI/BV 3.624*** 3.248*** 4.904*** 10.09** 4.780*** 
 [6.55] [10.50] [4.79] [2.40] [10.16] 
RD/BV 1.934*** 7.908*** -6.230* 8.923** 2.005*** 
 [3.51] [10.05] [-1.95] [2.27] [3.73] 
Ln_Sales -3.645*** -0.681 0.531 10.19 -1.074 
 [-3.52] [-0.31] [0.37] [0.77] [-0.95] 
MKTSHARE -10.69 -0.449 -3.664 27.02 -0.268 
 [-0.87] [-0.03] [-0.64] [0.57] [-0.02] 
LEV 0.019 1.086 -0.867 8.423 0.004 
 [0.57] [1.37] [-1.40] [1.01] [0.06] 
Intercept 86.46*** 15.00 1.066 -161.5 25.4 
 [4.19] [0.34] [0.04] [-0.57] [1.18] 
      
N 527 853 210 371 923 
R-sq 0.312 0.435 0.264 0.198 0.344 
Adj. R-sq 0.168 0.42 0.226 0.184 0.247 
 
Notes: * indicate levels of significance (*** pv< 1%, ** pv< 5%; * pv< 10%). 
 
I opted for the use the FE panel data regression, as this approach has certain advantages 
over the simpler OLS models in cross-section. It corrects for unobserved effects which in 
OLS regression would produce biased estimators. As the study focuses on different 
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countries, FE panel models seem preferable, given that the non-observable effects are 
inherent to a specific country and it is unlikely that the environmental conditions changed 
during the period of study5. In the basic model only a few variables are considered.  
The residual income is a reliable factor for increasing firm market performance. The 
estimators are all significant at the 5% level and positive, with higher levels for the 
Swedish sample, which confirms the specificity of Swedish firms (β1, SW = 10.09, t-test = 
2.40). The main variable, RD/BV, exhibits positive and significant evidence for the UK, 
Germany, France and Sweden while it is negative for Italy. German and Sweden 
coefficients are obviously bigger than others (β2,GR = 7.908, β2, SW = 8.923). It seems that 
R&D expenditures have a greater impact on market value for firms operating in countries 
other than the UK, other conditions being equal. 
For all countries except Italy, investing one euro in research and development has a 
more than proportional impact on a firm’s market value, with an even more pronounced 
effect for Swedish and German firms. Results regarding UK data are in line with previous 
studies (Hughes, 2008). I also find similarities with studies on Continental Europe data. In 
Hall and Oriani (2006) there is positive evidence of R&D effect on the market value of US, 
UK, German and French companies, albeit less significant than in the present study. 
Furthermore, they did not find significant evidence for Italian data, for which I find a 
negative correlation, confirming the possibility that the Italian Stock Exchange does not 
consider R&D expenses as value relevant. In Bae and Kim (2003) the coefficient for R&D 
in the German sample is about 11.847, showing a comparable strong effect of this variable 
on market value.  
**************************************************************** 
The relevance of country indicators is tested by three new regressions in panel FE for 
the full sample. First of all, I add three new interacting variables in regressions (1), (2) and 
(3) in Table 5, which aim to control for a potential effect of legal and financial 
environment on the impact of R&D on firm value: RD*ANT_DIR for anti-director rights 
effect, RD*FIN_ACT for the development of the stock market and private sector loan 
market effect, and RD*IFRS for the effect of the new accounting rules from 2005. The 
results confirm the positive effect of a strong legal protection for shareholders and well-
                                               
5  The Hausman test offers robust evidence to support fixed effects compared with random effects. 
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developed financial markets for the market valuation of innovation. The effect of R&D on 
firm market value is positive and strongly significant in each regression. The country 
variables go in the expected direction: RD*ANT_DIR is positive and significant (β3 = 
1.066, t-test = 4.35), indicating that a high level of shareholders’ protection increases the 
valuation of R&D by investors. 
RD*FIN_ACT is significant, too (β4 = 2.534, t-test = 3.92). The development of loan 
and equity markets is a key factor for a better valuation of assets especially when they have 
long-term benefits and a high level of information asymmetries such as R&D expenditures. 
Booth et al. (2006) reach similar conclusions for a sample of firms domiciled in OECD 
country members. The interaction between RD/BV and the IFRS dummy is not significant. 
This means that the change in the accounting standards from 2005 has not brought any 
sensible modification in the market valuation of R&D. 
In regression (4) in Table 5 the effect of firm market share is tested by interacting 
RD/BV with a variable which accounts for market share (MKTSHARE). I find that it has no 
significance over the effect that R&D has on market value. However, previous research has 
not reached a conclusive opinion about the importance of market share on innovation 
activities and firm value, either. Blundell et al. (1999) and Pindado et al. (2010) provide 
evidence of a positive influence while Toivanen et al. (2002) do not find any significant 
effect for UK firms. The debt-to-equity ratio is not significant, either, indicating little 
attention from investors to this variable in the R&D valuation context. 
In order to test the importance of firm size and industry I sort the entire sample into 
three macro-sectors according to their level of R&D intensity as in Table 3. The most 
innovative sectors are commonly defined as hi-tech, medium-tech (i.e. the middle group), 
and low-tech (i.e. the less innovative corporations). I apply model (13) and regress the 
dependent variable FVi,t via panel FE for each sub-sample. Firm, country and time fixed 
effects are added in each regression. Results are presented in Table 6. 
The residual income (RI/BV) is positive and significant, but the effect is stronger in 
non-hi-tech industries (β1, Low-tech = 7.101, t-test = 12.08; β1, Hi-tech = 1.305, t-test = 1.99), 
indicating that for these firms it is more important to have a stable stream of cash flows 
rather than preforming R&D investment. 
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Table 5 – Panel FE estimates for testing the relationship between the dependent variable FV = (MV-
BV)/BV and different sets of independent variables 
This table presents evidence of the relationship between the dependent variable and different sets of 
independent variables for the full sample. The number of observations is 2884 for all years. MV is the firm 
market value measured 6 months after the end of every financial year. BV is the firm book value of assets 
measured at the end of the financial year. RI is the firm residual income. RD is the year firm expenditure in 
research and development. MKTSHARE is the firm’s market share. LEV is the debt to equity ratio. ANT_DIR 
and FIN_ACT measure the legal and financial environment in each country. RD*ANT_DIR, RD*FIN_ACT, 
RD*IFRS and RD_MKTSHARE are interactions between RD/BV and the other 4 variables. T-tests are shown 
in brackets below the parameter estimates. Year and country dummies have been included in every 
regression for time and country effects. R-squares and adj. R-squares are listed at the bottom of the table. 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
      
RI/BV 3.693*** 3.364*** 3.458***  3.432*** 
 [10.45] [9.58] [9.84] 
 [9.78] 
RD/BV 5.786*** 2.703** 2.256***  1.927*** 
 [6.41] [2.07] [5.99] 
 [5.03] 
RD*ANT_DIR 1.066***   
  
 [4.35]   
  
RD*FIN_ACT  2.534***  
  
  [3.92]  
  
RD*IFRS   0.199 
  
   [0.86] 
  
RD_MKTSHARE     -2.006 
     [-0.42] 
LEV     0.018 
     [0.40] 
      
YEAR YES YES YES  YES 
COUNTRY YES YES YES  YES 
Intercept 23.72 23.8 23.74  24.06 
 [0.57] [0.57] [0.57]  [0.58] 
      N 2884 2884 2884  2884 
R-sq 0.376 0.474 0.569  0.64 
Adj. R-sq 0.372 0.366 0.477  0.580 
 
Notes: * indicate levels of significance (*** pv< 1%, ** pv< 5%; * pv< 10%). 
 
For hi-tech firms, it is imperative to invest in R&D, and financial markets do 
appreciate this investment (β2, Hi-tech = 8.732, t-test = 4.02). RD/BV is negative and 
significant for low-tech firms. The interaction between RD/BV and Ln_Sales is particularly 
interesting. For hi-tech and med-tech firms the loadings on RD_Sales are negative and 
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significant (β3, Hi-tech = -0.503, t-test = -4.34; β3, Med-tech = -0.409, t-test = -3.62). The 
interacting effect of R&D and Sales is positive and significant for low-tech firms (β3, Low-
tech = 0.304, t-test = 2.36).  
A joint interpretation of the coefficients therefore allows a strengthening of the 
hypothesis that in high innovation industries it is necessary to maintain significant R&D 
investment in order to have an advantage in terms of market value. In other industries, 
earnings are more highly valued. 
 
Table 6 – Panel FE estimates for testing the relationship between the dependent variable FV = (MV-
BV)/BV and independent variables 
This table presents evidence of the relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables. 
The full sample has been divided into three groups based on the propensity to innovate of firms’ industry 
sectors. The number of observations is listed at the bottom of the table. MV is the firm market value 
measured 6 months after the end of every financial year. BV is the firm book value of assets measured at the 
end of the financial year. RI is the firm residual income. RD is the year firm expenditure in research and 
development. LEV is the debt to equity ratio. RD_Sales is the interaction between RD/BV and Ln_Sales. T-
tests are shown in brackets below the parameter estimates. Year and country dummies have been included in 
every regression for time and country effects. R-squares and adj. R-squares are listed at the bottom of the 
table.  
 
 Hi-tech Med-tech Low-tech  
     
RI/BV 1.305** 6.798*** 7.101***  
 [1.99] [20.62] [12.08]  
RD/BV 8.732*** 5.424* -7.781**  
 [4.02] [1.87] [-2.56]  
RD_Sales -0.503*** -0.449*** 0.304**  
 [-4.34] [-3.62] [2.36]  
LEV -0.007 0.002 0.039  
 [-0.06] [0.06] [0.35]  
YEAR YES YES YES  
COUNTRY YES YES YES  
Intercept 22.89** 6.393 3.923  
 [2.19] [1.10] [0.54]  
     
N 1176 1021 687  
R-sq 0.36 0.433 0.29  
Adj. R-sq. 0.223 0.251 0.333  
 
Notes: * indicate levels of significance (*** pv< 1%, ** pv< 5%; * pv< 10%). 
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In a similar perspective, firm size not only impacts negatively on R&D intensity for 
firms operating in these industries as previous theoretical approaches and empirical 
evidence have demonstrated (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Cohen and Klepper; 1996). It is 
closely related to the market valuation of R&D expenditures by investors. In some sectors, 
mostly hi-tech ones, small firms are more successful in generating tangible outputs from 
innovation, they are more productive than larger firms (Acs and Audretsch, 1988), and 
they are appreciated by investors. The impact of the interaction between firm size and 
R&D is positive for larger firms in low tech sectors because size helps firms to spread the 
costs of innovation on more projects, and to take advantage of economies of scale, high 
concentration and higher appropriability conditions (Lin and Huang, 2008).  
Firm size is closely correlated to market share as it can be observed by the correlation 
matrix in Table 2. Larger firms normally have a higher market share, other things being 
equal. This might explain why there is no evidence of a market share effect on the value 
relevance of R&D.  As most firms operate in the hi-tech sectors, size has a negative impact 
on the market valuation of R&D and market share should impact firm value in a similar 
direction.  
No predictive power is assigned to leverage; the effect of this variable remains 
controversial. Previous research has also failed to give definitive results on this topic. 
******************************************************************* 
In order to assure the validity of the previous assumptions I performed various 
robustness checks, first, by using a different dependent variable, the firm’s market value 
deflated by sales. There are a number of contributions in the literature where sales are used 
as a deflator for similar models, as in Hirschey (1985) in the U.S. context, and in Stark and 
Thomas (1998) for UK firms. I perform in this case only a panel analysis for every 
country, I include in the model only the most relevant variables: RI /Sales and RD/Sales, 
and I control for firm size, market share, and leverage. The results are presented in Table 7. 
It seems that the hypotheses concerning R&D are verified in all countries except Italy, 
confirming the peculiarity of the Italian stock market. The coefficients are strongly 
significant and positive for France, Germany, UK and Sweden. The RI effect is positive for 
all countries. The impact of size remains negative and significant throughout the entire 
sample. Most of the firm-year observations belong to the hi-tech and medium-tech sectors, 
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so it is not surprising that size is negatively valued by the markets. The other variables do 
not seem to add additional predictive power to the model, thus confirming the results of the 
previous regressions. The overall predictive power of the model seems adequate, with R-
squares above 0.35 for all countries. 
Second, I perform a robustness check for correcting a potential endogeneity problem 
that might afflict the R&D variable in the basic model (10). Firm value and R&D 
expenditures can influence each other as higher R&D investment boosts firm value and the 
latter helps to increase firms’ investment in R&D. I try to alleviate this problem by 
instrumenting the R&D variable by its lags up to three years. 
 
Table 7 – Panel FE estimates of the relationship between (MV-BV) / Sales and most important 
independent variables 
This table presents evidence of the relationship between the dependent variable and most important 
independent variables for every country sample. Annual sales are used as a deflator for a robustness check. 
The number of observations is listed at the bottom of the table for each country. MV is the firm market value 
measured 6 months after the end of every financial year. BV is the firm book value of assets measured at the 
end of the financial year. RI is the firm residual income. RD is the year firm expenditure in research and 
development. MKTSHARE is the firm’s market share. LEV is the debt to equity ratio. Ln_Sales is the natural 
log of sales at the end of the fiscal year. T-tests are shown in brackets below the parameter estimates. Year 
dummies have been included in every regression for time effects. R-squares and adj. R-squares are listed at 
the bottom of the table 
 
 FR GR IT SW UK 
      
RI/BV 6.135*** 0.249*** 1.919*** 8.305** 3.673*** 
 [193.48] [27.07] [2.81] [-2.32] [-10.92] 
RD/BV 3.934*** 2.711*** -0.115 9.346*** 0.767*** 
 [7.97] [10.56] [-0.20] [2.94] [4.96] 
Ln_Sales -3.446*** -1.020*** -0.473** -1.938*** -1.646*** 
 [-6.15] [-4.98] [-2.48] [-3.47] [-11.58] 
MKTSHARE 52.22 0.256 0.256 1.197 -0.558*** 
 [0.88] [0.19] [0.42] [0.74] [-3.36] 
LEV -0.033 0.019 -0.143** 0.573** -0.345 
 [-0.21] [0.26] [-2.18] [1.99] [-0.43] 
Intercept -7.527*** 21.29*** 10.97*** 42.86*** 32.13*** 
 [-6.64] [5.15] [2.79] [3.59] [11.80] 
      
N 527 853 210 371 923 
R-sq 0.791 0.589 0.449 0.578 0.371 
Adj. R-sq 0.689 0.569 0.314 0.49 0.256 
 
Notes: * indicate levels of significance (*** pv< 1%, ** pv< 5%; * pv< 10%). 
54 
 
In this case, the former values of R&D may indirectly influence firm value but are not 
influenced the other way around. The results are presented in Table 8. For reasons of 
space, I report only the results of the basic model for each country. 
The results offer robust evidence that R&D have a positive effect on firm value. This is 
confirmed for every country with the exception of Italy. The Hansen J-tests support the 
validity of the instruments. The null hypothesis that the instruments are valid is not 
rejected. The other variables are mostly not significant and have little predictive power on 
the dependent variable. 
 
Table 8  IV-GMM estimates of the relationship between FV and most important independent variables 
This table presents evidence of the relationship between the dependent variable and most important 
independent variables for every country sample. The number of observations is listed at the bottom of the 
table for each country. MV is the firm market value measured 6 months after the end of every financial year. 
BV is the firm book value of assets measured at the end of the financial year. RI is the firm residual income. 
RD is estimated by three annual lags of the same variable for correcting endogeneity bias. MKTSHARE is the 
firm’s market share. LEV is the debt to equity ratio. Ln_Sales is the natural log of sales at the end of the fiscal 
year. T-tests are shown in brackets below the parameter estimates. Year dummies have been included in 
every regression for time effects. R-squares and adj. R-squares are listed at the bottom of the table. Hansen J- 
tests perform tests of overidentifying restrictions of the instruments. 
 
 FR GR IT SW UK 
      
RI/BV 1.764*** 4.591*** -3.5 2.072** 3.526 
 [3.83] [6.58] [-0.38] [2.03] [1.53] 
RD/BV 8.403*** 9.212*** 43.7 2.054** 5.358** 
 [5.81] [4.64] [1.35] [2.11] [2.28] 
Ln_Sales -2.323** -0.303 2.567 13.81 -0.515 
 [-2.25] [-0.27] [1.32] [0.62] [-0.58] 
MKTSHARE -29.01 4.698 -5.959 93.39 -22.8 
 [-1.32] [0.61] [-0.65] [0.96] [-1.45] 
LEV -0.747 0.963 -0.402 -13.92 0.027 
 [-0.72] [0.81] [-0.27] [-0.56] [1.16] 
Intercept 58.65*** 6.78 -57.69 -253.8 16.38 
 [2.82] [0.28] [-1.36] [-0.54] [0.99] 
      
Hansen 2.03 
(0.36) 
1.29 
(0.52) 
2.41 
(0.29) 
2.72 
(0.25) 
0.53 
(0.76) 
N 300 488 120 212 528 
R-sq 0.606 0.705 0.494 0.42 0.533 
Adj. R-sq 0.595 0.700 0.329 0.416 0.525 
Notes: * indicate levels of significance (*** pv< 1%, ** pv< 5%; * pv< 10%). 
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4.2 The accounting based model 
A. The model, research questions and variables 
The extension of the residual income model has been recently proposed by Stark and 
Thomas (1998), Akbar and Stark (2003) and Hughes (2008). Its assumptions follow the 
seminal work of Ohlson (1989). The model hypothesises that the market value of a firm 
can be represented by a linear function of five variables: Book Value of Equity, R&D, 
Dividends, Earnings, Capital Contributions and other information. By now, it has been 
tested only on UK data. The reason I propose this extension is to evidence that R&D 
expenditures may have a signalling role for investors. R&D can convey information about 
the goodness of future earnings together with dividends, earnings and capital contributions 
from shareholders. 
As previous empirical research shows, a deflator should be used for all variables in 
order to reduce multicollinearity and other problems deriving from scale (Dedman et al. 
2009). We use the closing book value of equity as a deflator and thus, the estimated model 
is the following: 
 
ܯܸ݅,ݐ −ܤܸ݅,ݐ
ܤܸ݅,ݐ = ߚ1 ܴܦ݅,ݐܤܸ݅,ݐ + ߚ2 ܦ݅,ݐܤܸ݅,ݐ + ߚ3 ܧ݅,ݐܤܸ݅,ݐ + ߚ4 ܥܥ݅,ݐܤܸ݅,ݐ + ߙ݅ + ߣݐ + ߝ݅,ݐ 
 
 
Where MVi,t is the market value of the firm i at time t; BVi,t is the book value of the 
firm i at time t; RDi,t is the research and development expenditure of firm i at time t; Di,t is 
the amount of dividends paid by the firm i during year t; Ei,t are the earnings of the firm i at 
time t and CCi,t are the capital contributions of the firm i at the same period t. Then firm 
individual effects (αi), time effects (λt) and an error term (vi,t) are added. I expect that the 
effect of the independent variables on firm value is positive following the results of 
previous contributions. 
In a further specification of the model I address more exhaustively different hypotheses 
which concern investor protection and the quality of legal and financial environment in 
each country. In this case the model would be the following:  
ܯ ௜ܸ,௧ −ܤ ௜ܸ,௧
ܤ ௜ܸ,௧ = ߚଵ ܴܦ௜,௧ܤ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߚଶ ܦ௜,௧ܤ ௜ܸ,௧ + ߚଷ ܧ௜,௧ܤ ௜ܸ ,௧ + ߚସ ܥܥ௜,௧ܤ ௜ܸ,௧ + ෍ߚ௜ܴܦ ∗ ܫܸܰ.ܴܱܲܶ +ଵ଴௜ୀହ ߙ௜ + ߣ௧ + ߝ௜ ,௧ (14)                              
(13) 
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The market value of equity is calculated as the year-end market price multiplied by the 
number of shares outstanding. The book value is measured as the sum of the share capital 
plus reserves. Cash Dividends paid indicates the total cash dividends paid to different 
classes of shares (ordinary, preference and savings shares) during the fiscal year. Earnings 
are measured as the bottom-line earnings ﬁgure as reported in the ﬁnancial statements, plus 
research and development expenses incurred during the year. The capital contributions 
represent the net revenues from the shares’ purchase and sale. It includes amounts received 
from the conversion of bonds or preference shares into ordinary shares, from the exchange 
of shares with bonds, from the sale of own shares and income from stock options. 
Research and development expenditures represent all direct and indirect costs 
associated with the creation and development of new processes, techniques, applications 
and products with commercial possibilities.  
INV.PROT are the legal and financial variables inspired by the paper of La Porta et al. 
(1998, 2006) and Levine (2000). The “disclosure” variable positively depends on the level 
of transparency of the communication prospects offered by listed firms to investors and 
analysts. The “anti-director rights” variable takes values from 0 to 6 where 6 is the highest 
protection for minority shareholders. The “creditor rights” variable is an index which 
aggregates creditor rights and takes values from 0 to 4. These rights comprise rights of 
creditors during reorganization procedures, rights to get collateral in case of 
reorganization, creditor consent in order to permit managers reorganizing the distressed 
firm and creditors’ power to change management in case of reorganization. 
It can be seen that the variables used in this case include more issues related to the legal 
environment of the country of domicile and thus, give a better framework of it. The 
FIN_ACT variable accounts for the development of the local equity and loan markets. As 
in the previous section these variables are interacted with RD/BV in order to verify their 
moderating effect in the market valuation of R&D. 
 
 
B. Sample selection 
The second model is tested for a sample of European firms. The annual accounting data 
for each company were extracted from Datastream. Initially, financial and accounting data 
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related to listed companies domiciled in 14 EU countries for the period 2000-2009 were 
collected. The initial sample consisted of 6,921 listed companies divided into 14 European 
countries. However, the number of firms which have positive R&D is considerably low for 
many countries. Disclosure of R&D is one of the main issues which influence empirical 
studies on innovation, as it is not compulsory outside the US. I decided to concentrate only 
on five countries out of 14, where there were a sufficient number of firms disclosing R&D 
outlays. This would prevent the analysis from producing biased results. 
Companies were divided according to the classification adopted by ICB (Industry 
Classification Benchmark) in 10 industries; all financial firms were excluded (ICB Code: 
8000 FINANCIALS). The ICB classification code is adopted by the FTSE Group – 
London Stock Exchange and has become an international well-known system for sorting 
firms based on their main operating industry (See Table 3 in Appendix, for a description of 
the sectors). In order to be included in the final dataset each firm had to meet two 
conditions: the book value and market value had to present no missing values in each year, 
and the book value should assume a positive value in order to use it as a deflator. After this 
first selection individual observations for each firm that had extreme values and outliers 
were eliminated. This was done by implementing different statistics tests on the sample 
such as “dfbeta” for data leverage, or “Cook’s distance”. These statistics measure the 
distance that a particular regression coefficient would shift when a potential outlier is 
included or excluded from the regression. In some countries it is common to have two 
classes of shares like A or B in Sweden or UK. The shares grant different voting rights to 
different groups of shareholders, or different dividend rights. In this case I dropped all B 
shares, as they would have produced duplications in all accounting items such as R&D 
expenditures, sales etc. (As the firm is the same, there would be two observations per year 
with identical accounting data and two different stock prices, A and B). 
At the end of the process the selected countries were Finland, France, Germany, Sweden 
and UK with 756, 2849, 2603, 1155 and 4050 firm – year observations respectively for the 
years 2000-2009.  
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C. Descriptive statistics and empirical results 
 First, in Tables 9 and 10 some descriptive statistics for the key variables for each 
country are displayed. The number of firm – year observations for which R&D is bigger 
than zero or not missing ranges from 430 for Finland to 1643 for UK. In percentage, 
Finnish firms invest or declare more R&D (56.87%) compared to other countries. It can be 
observed that the dependent variable has a similar mean value for Finland, France and 
Germany and it’s bigger for Sweden and UK. This indicates that firms in Sweden and UK 
sample have greater capitalization other things being equal. As it can be expected, the 
median values are smaller than mean values for every country as the number of small firms 
is usually higher. The independent variables are somehow more homogeneous across 
countries.  
 
Table 9 – R&D firm-year observations and total firm–year observations per country over the years 
2000-2009 
 
Country of domicile 
R&D  
firm-year 
 observations 
Total  
observations 
R&D  
% on total 
    
FINLAND 430 756 56.87% 
FRANCE 973 2849 34.15% 
GERMANY 1108 2603 42.56% 
SWEDEN 485 1155 41.99% 
UK 1643 4050 40.56% 
 
Mean values for RD/BV are 0.060 for Finland, 0.043 for France, 0.050 for Germany, 
0.065 for Sweden and 0.067 for the UK. Earnings are on average smaller for UK firms 
while dividend rates seem to higher for Finnish firms. 
The empirical analysis begins by testing the relationship between R&D activities, 
dividends, earnings, capital contributions and firm value. The analysis is performed by 
panel data for a period of 10 years. The models used are different. First, I apply OLS 
estimators and panel regression with fixed effects. The benefits of the fixed effects 
methodology were highlighted in Section 4.1.C. Stark and Thomas (1998) and Dedman et 
al. (2009) have used a similar methodology for UK samples. The superiority of the fixed 
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effect estimator over the random effect is assured by applying the Hausman test. Results 
are exhibited in Table 11. 
 
Table 10 – Descriptive statistics by country, years 2000-2009 
 (MV-BV)/BV is the dependent variable. MV is the firm market value measured 6 months after the end of 
every financial year. BV is the firm book value of assets measured at the end of the financial year. DIV are 
total cash dividends paid to different classes of shares. RD is the year firm expenditure in research and 
development. CC are capital contributions which represent the net revenues from the shares’ purchase and 
sale. E are earnings which are measured as the bottom-line earnings ﬁgure reported in the ﬁnancial 
statements, plus research and development expenses incurred during the year.  
 
    
Mean 
 
Std. 
Dev.  
1% 
 %tile  
Median 
 
95%  
%tile 
  
 FINLAND (MV-BV)/BV  1.570  1.703  0.027  1.066  4.632   
  RD/BV  0.060  0.147  0.000  0.010  0.285   
  DIV/BV  0.080  0.090  0.000  0.059  0.242   
  CC/BV  0.029  0.194  0.000  0.000  0.129   
  E/BV  0.105  0.361  -1.275  0.136  0.417   
               
FRANCE (MV-BV)/BV  1.756  2.348  0.014  1.075  5.841   
  RD/BV  0.043  0.139  0.000  0.000  0.240   
  DIV/BV  0.042  0.061  0.000  0.029  0.135   
  CC/BV  0.035  0.166  0.000  0.000  0.202   
  E/BV  0.111  0.227  -0.824  0.127  0.393   
               
GERMANY (MV-BV)/BV  1.650  2.061  0.023  0.987  5.696   
  RD/BV  0.050  0.103  0.000  0.000  0.230   
  DIV/BV  0.040  0.078  0.000  0.027  0.122   
  CC/BV  0.020  0.094  0.000  0.000  0.108   
  E/BV  0.090  0.313  -1.204  0.121  0.417   
               
SWEDEN (MV-BV)/BV  2.204  2.919  0.025  1.373  6.870   
  RD/BV  0.065  0.154  0.000  0.000  0.332   
  DIV/BV  0.053  0.069  0.000  0.038  0.181   
  CC/BV  0.055  0.188  0.000  0.000  0.384   
  E/BV  0.095  0.279  -0.809  0.136  0.421   
               
UK (MV-BV)/BV  2.374  5.974  0.021  1.208  7.131   
  RD/BV  0.067  0.714  0.000  0.000  0.226   
  DIV/BV  0.068  0.351  0.000  0.044  0.177   
  CC/BV  0.064  0.632  0.000  0.002  0.347   
  E/BV   0.062   1.161   -1.861   0.126   0.464   
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The results support the assumption that R&D expenditures have a positive effect over 
firm value. The OLS and the FE estimators are generally positive and significant. If the 
panel FE regression is considered, it seems that investors assign more value relevance to 
R&D in Sweden and UK (βSW = 2.611, βUK = 3.290). The other variables have all the 
expected sign, they are positive and significant. Although there is not a clear economic 
theory behind, dividends should influence positively firm value (Fama and French, 1998; 
Rees, 1997; Hand and Landsman, 2005; Hughes 2008). This effect might be explained by 
differentials in tax rates, information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders (Hughes, 
2008). Different legislators might tax differently dividends compared to capital gain. For 
example, in the US the tax rate on dividends was higher for a certain period.  
 
Table 11 - Pooled cross section estimates and panel FE estimates for testing the relationship between 
the dependent variable (MV-BV)/BV and different independent variables 
MV is the firm market value measured 6 months after the end of every financial year. BV is the firm book 
value of assets measured at the end of the financial year. RD is the year firm expenditure in research and 
development. DIV are total cash dividends paid to different classes of shares. CC are capital contributions 
which represent the net revenues from the shares’ purchase and sale. E are earnings which are measured as 
the bottom-line earnings ﬁgure as reported in the ﬁnancial statements, plus research and development 
expenses incurred during the year. T-tests are shown in brackets below the parameter estimates. Year 
dummies have been included in every regression for time effects. The number of observations, Hausman tests 
and adj. R-squares are listed at the bottom of the table.  
 
  FIN  FR  GER  SW  UK 
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
                 
RD/BV 4.077*** 1.361***  1.308*** 1.156***  0.213 1.332**  3.498*** 2.611***  3.195*** 3.290*** 
  [5.22] [3.00]  [2.74] [2.78]  [0.42] [2.50]  [4.02] [2.91]  [7.55] [27.71] 
E/BV 1.019*** 1.148***  1.429*** 1.318***  0.406** 0.291**  0.242 1.013***  1.516*** 1.433*** 
  [2.86] [5.59]  [2.92] [5.67]  [2.19] [2.13]  [0.45] [2.61]  [4.31] [17.09] 
DIV/BV 5.052*** 5.166***  6.100*** 3.493***  1.648*** 1.003**  5.977*** 3.489**  2.649*** 2.498*** 
  [8.19] [7.20]  [3.87] [3.66]  [2.60] [2.14]  [3.17] [2.25]  [3.50] [11.51] 
CC/BV 1.586** 1.496***  1.456*** 1.003***  1.834*** 0.749**  2.282** 0.863*  2.190*** 1.589*** 
  [2.48] [4.65]  [4.23] [3.77]  [3.26] [2.01]  [2.26] [1.90]  [4.09] [9.36] 
YEAR YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Intercept 1.402*** 1.516***  2.462*** 2.804***  2.159*** 2.283***  2.154*** 2.340***  3.758*** 3.925*** 
  [3.49] [8.08]  [8.64] [20.42]  [10.25] [20.58]  [6.16] [9.56]  [5.76] [15.13] 
                 
N 601 601  2151 2151  1933 1933  973 973  3047 3047 
Adj. R2 0.29 0.15  0.13 0.28  0.31 0.48  0.34 0.45  0.36 0.27 
Hausman 
test 
 66.54 
(0.00) 
  96.70 
(0.00) 
  85.54 
(0.00) 
  92.00 
(0.00) 
  64.46 
(0.00) 
                              
Notes: * indicate levels of significance (*** pv< 1%, ** pv< 5%; * pv< 10%). 
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In this case investors should negatively react to new dividends. The signalling 
approach is also used to explain why dividends have an effect on corporate value. They 
convey information to investors about future profitability. Firm managers are not very keen 
to rapidly change the dividend rate every year. They tend to keep it stable (Litner, 1956). 
Hence, dividend payments are interpreted as a signal about future stable earnings (Baker et 
al. 2001).  
It might be possible that the R&D variable in the previous regression might suffer from 
endogeneity problems. This should happen if it is correlated with the error term. The R&D 
variable is a candidate for endogeneity because investment in innovation is influenced by 
firm size, and thus firm value.  
 
Table 12 – Instrumental variable estimates via 2SLS and GMM methodology for testing the 
relationship between the dependent variable (MV-BV)/BV and different independent variables 
MV is the firm market value measured 6 months after the end of every financial year. BV is the firm book 
value of assets measured at the end of the financial year. RD is the year firm expenditure in research and 
development. DIV are total cash dividends paid to different classes of shares. CC are capital contributions 
which represent the net revenues from the shares’ purchase and sale. E are earnings which are measured as 
the bottom-line earnings ﬁgure as reported in the ﬁnancial statements, plus research and development 
expenses incurred during the year. T-tests are shown in brackets below the parameter estimates. Year 
dummies have been included in every regression for time effects. The number of observations, Hansen-
Sargan tests for misspecification of instruments and adj. R-squares are listed at the bottom of the table.  
 
  FIN  FR  GER  SW  UK 
  2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 
                 
RD/BV 4.251*** 4.533***  1.981*** 1.691***  -0.341 -0.574  5.458*** 5.207***  0.993 2.775** 
  [9.81] [5.15]  [4.09] [2.83]  [-0.57] [-0.96]  [5.61] [4.20]  [0.85] [2.16] 
E/BV 0.491*** 0.552**  1.009*** 1.195**  0.23 0.212  -0.237 0.0283  1.681*** 1.477*** 
  [2.60] [2.13]  [3.81] [1.97]  [1.29] [0.77]  [-0.39] [0.03]  [20.21] [3.96] 
DIV/BV 6.627*** 6.614***  6.083*** 5.460***  1.634*** 1.626**  5.512*** 5.531***  2.553*** 2.434*** 
  [10.64] [10.72]  [8.42] [2.62]  [3.16] [2.56]  [3.30] [3.69]  [16.38] [4.29] 
CC/BV 0.807*** 0.835**  1.041** 0.987**  1.826*** 1.623**  0.751 0.754  5.042*** 1.862 
  [2.61] [2.04]  [2.49] [2.36]  [3.70] [2.16]  [0.80] [0.69]  [2.58] [0.83] 
YEAR YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Intercept 0.515*** 0.483***  0.523*** 0.540***  1.095*** 1.107***  0.930*** 0.921***  0.926*** 1.069*** 
  [3.17] [3.49]  [4.25] [4.42]  [7.83] [9.92]  [3.11] [4.38]  [4.24] [5.37] 
                 
N 377 377  1258 1258  1175 1175  552 552  1881 1881 
Adj. R2 0.41 0.41  0.13 0.13  0.21 0.21  0.35 0.34  0.50 0.61 
Hansen - 
Sargan test 
3.07 
(0.38) 
2.13 
(0.54) 
 2.16 
(0.53) 
1.51 
(0.67) 
 1.23 
(0.74) 
1.77 
(0.62) 
 1.50 
(0.68) 
0.81 
(0.84) 
 5.06 
(0.16) 
5.60 
 (0.17) 
                              
Notes: * indicate levels of significance (*** pv< 1%, ** pv< 5%; * pv< 10%). 
 
62 
 
Larger firms tend to invest more in R&D because they have more resources. Firms that 
have a better valuation of their R&D projects may decide to increment the amount invested 
because of this favorable valuation by the market causing reverse causality. Fixed effects 
panel estimators and OLS estimators would produce biased results in this case. I correct 
this problem instrumenting RD/BV with its lags up to 4 years in the past (Lag 1 to lag 4). 
By doing this, R&D lags will influence the future firm market value via the current 
expenditure in R&D but they will not be influenced by the dependent variable. Results are 
exhibited in Table 12. 
In table 12 a 2SLS estimator and a GMM one are estimated. The 2SLS regression 
assumes that the errors are i.i.d. When this is not the case, it may produce consistent but 
not efficient estimates. The GMM estimator corrects this problem. The results show 
positive loadings for RD/BV for all countries with the exception of Germany. The 2SLS 
estimator and the GMM are similar for Finland, France and Sweden indicating a normal 
distribution of the disturbances for these samples. The coefficients of the other variables do 
not change considerably when I opt for the GMM approach. The loadings on RD/BV even 
in this model are less strong for UK just like in the Section 4.1 supporting the view that in 
Continental Europe countries R&D has a stronger impact on firm value. 
The Hansen-Sargan test is not rejected showing that the instruments used for 
estimating the current value of R&D are valid and they are not correlated with the error 
term. 
*************************************************************** 
The results I present in the previous regressions may suffer a problem of selection bias 
which is related to the choice the firms make when they decide whether to disclose or not 
R&D investments. The missing values of this variable in the sample derive from no R&D 
investment during the year or may be subject of the desire of the firm’s managers to not 
display this type of investment. In this second case, what we see from the above 
regressions is only the effect of R&D on firm value for the firms that disclose this 
information; if the other group is not considered the coefficients on RD/BV might be biased 
and not consistent. The problem of selection bias in social sciences was studied by 
Heckman (1979) who introduced a new estimator for estimating the probability that a 
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certain variable is observed or not before inserting it in the main equation where it acts as 
an independent variable in an OLS regression. 
In order to check the robustness of previous results to a potential selection bias related 
to R&D disclosure, I build a sample selection model, where the main model is jointly 
estimated with a Probit model for the probability of reporting R&D. As previously 
described, this can be a relevant issue for European firms, as disclosure of R&D is not 
compulsory (Hall and Oriani, 2006). I decided to adopt a Heckman estimator with 
maximum likelihood for estimation. Its main advantages over the simpler two-step 
estimator rely on its better capabilities to have asymptotic efficient estimators in finite 
samples. The two-step estimator has proved to be consistent but not efficient especially for 
model estimates with heteroschedastic errors. It is more used for finding starting points 
before running the ML estimator (Greene, 2003). 
This Heckman correction first, estimates the probability that R&D is disclosed, by an 
indicator variable: YES R&D or NO R&D, depending on whether the firm i for year t has 
reported R&D or not. Afterwards, a second model is estimated where the inverse of the 
Mills ratio (lambda) from the selection regression is added as an additive independent 
variable. This is the ratio of the probability density function to the cumulative distribution 
function for a variable. It permits to correct the selection bias for non-observing the 
qualities of firms that decide to not disclose R&D. When it is added in the main regression, 
this will produce unbiased estimates for the independent variables (if lambda is 
significantly different from zero).  
Three new variables are included in the selection model: Ln_sales as a proxy for firm 
size, RD_sector which is the mean value of R&D investment for every industrial sector 
and FIN_LEV which is the debt-to-equity ratio for every firm. The rationale behind the 
choice to add size is that usually larger firms should report and thus invest more in R&D in 
absolute terms. Variables from the main equation are not included in the selection one in 
order to avoid multicollinearity issues. 
The R&D sector is an important driver for modulating an optimal level of investment 
in innovation for all the firms in that sector. It acts as a benchmark for managers and 
investors which compare firm R&D intensity to the R&D intensity level of its competitors. 
A relevant mismatch can be reflected in good or bad market performance.  
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Table 13 – Heckman probit regression for estimating the probability that reported R&D is positive 
and OLS regression for estimating the impact of R&D on firm value including the effect of the 
Heckman coefficients. 
MV is the firm market value measured 6 months after the end of every financial year. BV is the firm book 
value of assets measured at the end of the financial year. RD is the year firm expenditure in research and 
development. DIV are total cash dividends paid to different classes of shares. CC are capital contributions 
which represent the net revenues from the shares’ purchase and sale. E are earnings which are measured as 
the bottom-line earnings ﬁgure as reported in the ﬁnancial statements, plus research and development 
expenses incurred during the year. Ln_Sales is the log of annual firm sales. RD_Sector is the average value of 
R&D expenditure in a certain year for a certain industry. FIN_LEV is the firm debt-to-equity ratio. T-tests are 
shown in brackets below the parameter estimates. Year dummies have been included in every regression for 
time effects. The number of observations and the lambda test which measures the correlation between the 
two error terms is listed below. 
 
 FIN FR GER SW UK 
Main eq.           
RD/BV 3.782***  1.085***  0.0931  3.162***  2.419*** 
  [9.82]  [3.04]  [0.22]  [5.13]  [28.36] 
E/BV 1.023***  1.339***  0.375**  0.423  1.244*** 
  [4.54]  [5.76]  [2.49]  [1.13]  [17.21] 
DIV/BV 1.772***  1.686***  1.855***  2.407***  1.837*** 
  [5.26]  [5.66]  [4.09]  [4.70]  [36.00] 
CC/BV 4.119***  5.660***  1.475***  5.120***  2.019*** 
  [6.32]  [7.47]  [2.71]  [3.72]  [13.25] 
YEAR YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Intercept 0.812***  1.291***  1.615***  1.592***  0.0931 
  [7.69]  [17.00]  [22.59]  [11.97]  [1.01] 
            
Selection eq.           
Ln_Sales 0.0219  0.163***  0.103***  0.150***  0.022*** 
  [0.71]  [11.97]  [7.25]  [5.79]  [3.71] 
RD_Sector 1.376***  0.064***  -0.095  0.0107  0.015*** 
  [3.80]  [2.64]  [-1.41]  [1.59]  [3.48] 
FIN_LEV -0.489***  -0.386***  -0.416***  -0.851***  -0.065*** 
  [-11.37]  [-21.74]  [-22.09]  [-14.17]  [-7.90] 
Intercept 0.980**  -0.736***  0.113  0.152  0.084 
  [2.48]  [-4.39]  [0.65]  [0.53]  [1.28] 
            
N 756  2849  2603  1155  4050 
Lambda test 
(λ=0) 
11.60 
(0.02) 
 12.04 
(0.00) 
 9.81 
(0.001) 
 9.07 
(0.003) 
 14.22  
(0.00) 
Notes: * indicate levels of significance (*** pv< 1%, ** pv< 5%; * pv< 10%). 
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Hence it is more common that firms invest in and report R&D activity if they operate 
in sectors where R&D is considered as a value driver (Chauvin and Hirschey, 1993). 
According to the information asymmetry theory, firms with high R&D intensity should be 
penalized by a higher debt. This type of asset is usually financed by equity (Bhattacharya 
and Chiesa, 1995). Hence, the probability of disclosing or performing R&D should be 
negatively influenced by the financial leverage. The results are presented in Table 13. 
The variables used for the selection equation seem to be important. The possibility of 
disclosing and reporting R&D increases when firms get bigger (Ln_Sales is positive and 
significant for all countries with the exception of Finland. Firms that operate in sectors 
with high R&D intensity have a greater probability of reporting R&D. This is true for 
Finland, France and UK and not different from zero in the other two countries. The D/E 
ratio has a negative effect on the disclosure of R&D for every country as expected.  
The empirical evidence show however, that for all countries, the correlation of the error 
terms in the two equations is not significantly different from zero (lambda test), which 
implies that there is no bias arising from sample selection in the estimates of main 
equation. The conclusion from the sample selection estimation is that although R&D is 
observed for only a subset of firms in the Finnish, French, German, Swedish and UK 
economies, it is still possible to have consistent estimates of the effect of R&D on firm 
value. 
******************************************************************* 
At the end of this section I present estimates of an OLS regression with the inclusion of 
R&D with some country level variables like those in Section 4.1. The analysis is 
performed on the overall sample which comprises all firms from the 5 selected countries. 
The new variables are inspired by the seminal paper of La Porta et al. (1998) and La Porta 
et al. (2006). They measure the level of transparency in the market, the protection of 
investors and creditors and also the development level of loan and equity markets in the 
country. For a description of the variables, the readers can refer to Section 4.2.A. I interact 
RD/BV with each one of these variables. If the interaction effects are positive, then there is 
evidence that the impact of R&D on firm value is modulated by the legal and financial 
framework of the country of domicile. Results are shown in table 14. 
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Table 14 – OLS estimates of the impact between some firm and country indicators and the dependent 
variable (MV-BV)/BV.  
MV is the firm market value measured 6 months after the end of every financial year. BV is the firm book 
value of assets measured at the end of the financial year. RD is the year firm expenditure in research and 
development. DIV are total cash dividends paid to different classes of shares. CC are capital contributions 
which represent the net revenues from the shares’ purchase and sale. E are earnings which are measured as 
the bottom-line earnings ﬁgure as reported in the ﬁnancial statements, plus research and development 
expenses incurred during the year. Disclosure, ANT_DIR, FIN_ACT, CRED_RIGHTS are country indicators 
that measure market transparency, shareholder protections, development of loan and equity markets and 
creditor rights respectively. T-tests are shown in brackets below the parameter estimates. Year and country 
dummies have been included in every regression for time effects. Adj. R-squares and number of observations 
are listed below. 
 
 A B 
   
RD/BV 3.118*** 6.074** 
 [8.21] [2.05] 
E/BV 1.405*** 1.441*** 
 [4.68] [4.60] 
DIV/BV 2.788*** 2.748*** 
 [3.54] [3.57] 
CC/BV 2.076*** 2.103*** 
 [4.73] [4.51] 
RD*Disclosure  2.80*** 
  [2.87] 
RD*ANT_DIR  3.454*** 
  [3.83] 
RD*FIN_ACT  0.784* 
  [1.72] 
RD*CRED.RIGHTS 1.407* 
 [1.80] 
YEAR YES YES 
COUNTRY YES YES 
Intercept 2.716*** 2.762*** 
 [10.43] [10.54] 
   
N 8705 8705 
Adj. R-sq 0.297 0.303 
 
Notes: * indicate levels of significance (*** pv< 1%, ** pv< 5%; * pv< 10%). 
 
It can be observed that the impact of R&D on firm value is influenced by these 
variables. The interactions between RD/BV and the four country indicators are significant. 
It seems that a robust financial markets enhances the positive valuation of R&D 
(βRD*FIN_ACT = 0.784). The other three variables are positive and significant as well, 
following approximately the impact of RD*ANT_DIR in the section 4.1.C. 
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Conclusions 
In this chapter the impact of R&D on firm value for a sample of European firms was 
investigated. This topic has been studied by many scholars in the last 20 years which have 
concentrated mainly in US and UK firms given the availability of data and a reasonable 
level of efficiency of financial markets in these countries. I investigated this phenomenon 
for Continental Europe firms listed in 5 countries and I included a sample of UK firms for 
a comparison. The results confirm that the investors consider R&D as an asset for the firm 
even when national accounting standards force companies to expense this investment in 
the year it is incurred. The impact of R&D on firm value measured by firm market 
capitalization is always positive with the exception of Italian firms; this is confirmed by 
previous research.  
However, the empirical analysis shows that the impact of R&D changes across 
countries. It is stronger in bank-based countries like Germany; this might supports the view 
that shareholders in these economic systems are more able to value the long-term benefits 
of innovative projects rather than investors in Anglo-Saxon economies who may be more 
interested in short-term capital gains (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006). There are other firm 
characteristics which can remarkably change the way R&D is valued by the markets. In 
particular firm size and the industry where firms operate seem to significantly modulate 
this relationship. If the industry is considered as highly R&D- intensive with a high 
propensity to innovate, then investors assign much more importance to the effort in R&D 
that the single firm undertakes. On the other hand, R&D is not particularly appreciated in 
sectors where it is not a strong driver for growth. Firm size is related to the sector. In 
mature sectors with low growth rates size positively impacts the value relevance of R&D. 
In hi-tech sectors it has a negative effect. Other firm fundamentals like firm financial 
leverage or market share do not have sensible effects on the market valuation of R&D. In 
the second part of the chapter the positive effect of R&D on firm market performance is 
confirmed together with dividends, earnings and capital contributions. I find that the 
probability that firms invest and declare R&D depends positively from firm size, sector 
R&D intensity and negatively from the debt-to-equity ratio. If we consider the economic 
system of the country of domicile, it seems that R&D is more valued when financial 
markets are well developed and assure a reasonable level of efficiency to the investors. 
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5. The effect of R&D on stock returns; the model, descriptive statistics 
and empirical results 
 
5.1 The model, research questions and variables 
As previously highlighted, the valuation of R&D expenditures and their effective 
benefits for the firm in terms of future cash flows are difficult to evaluate for investors and 
analysts and may suffer mispricing problems. This can be due to extended information 
asymmetries between insiders and other stakeholders, the latters have always less 
information about the reliability of data that managers decide to disclose to the markets. 
Mispricing can be generated even by the accounting regime of R&D expenditures.  
Studies on the impact of R&D on the market performance of Continental European 
firms have been hampered by national accounting rules which still do not require the total 
disclosure of these outlays as in the US case. Moreover, only in the last 15 years has there 
been a significant effort for the harmonization of rules, the adoption of international best 
practices and for the real integration of different markets, making them more efficient even 
in terms of asset pricing. All listed firms in European markets have adopted the IASB 
financial reporting standards from 2004 in an effort towards harmonization of financial 
information to investors6. On the other hand, the number of firms that have increased their 
investment in R&D and/or disclosed it to the investors has grown constantly. 
The corporate governance of Continental European countries is remarkably different 
from that of US and UK firms. There is a huge presence of insider shareholders which may 
control more than 50% of the voting rights (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Tylecote and Ramirez, 
2006). This could be a bank as in Germany, the State as in France or family shareholders 
as in Italy. The Nordic countries lie somewhere in the middle between Germany and the 
UK with a strong presence of insiders as well as institutional investors. 
Prior studies using European datasets have highlighted a positive and significant effect 
of R&D on market value confirming the evidence found in the US that investors consider it 
as an asset which has long-term benefits on firm value (Hall and Oriani, 2006; Pindado et 
                                               
6 The IAS 38.52 describes the activities that have to be grouped as research and development expenditure. 
Basic research has to be expensed in the year when it is incurred. Development expenditures can be 
capitalized but under strict requirements. 
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al. 2010; Munari et al. 2010). However, the positive outcomes of R&D investment can be 
remarkably modulated by firm specific characteristics like size, corporate governance, cash 
flows, firm growth or country specific characteristics (Toivanen et al. 2002; Pindado et al. 
2010). The presence of different types of investors which have different investment 
horizons (Bae and Kim, 2003; Munari et al. 2010), or different market legal and financial 
frameworks (Hall and Oriani, 2006) can influence the market valuation of R&D (Booth et 
al. 2006).  
R&D investment contains a high degree of information asymmetries; insiders have 
usually more information about its potential outcomes in the long-term (Aboody and Lev, 
2000). These difficulties arise in countries where insiders can control big stakes of shares 
like in Continental Europe and where the private benefits of control are higher (Dyck and 
Zingales, 2004). Previous evidence for the US shows that generally investors are not able 
to correct their valuation of highly R&D-intensive stocks thus, generating abnormal 
returns. Mispricing should be more pronounced in Europe where disclosure is more 
problematic due to accounting rules and practices. Investors in Europe could suffer 
information risk more than in Anglo-Saxon markets, because it increases in presence of 
relevant inside information and low disclosure. There is evidence that information risk 
significantly impacts asset pricing because uninformed investors will require a higher rate 
of return for holding stocks with higher degree of private information (Easley and O’Hara, 
2002, 2004; Ciftci et al. 2011).  
We would expect that the stock variability of firms that invest more in R&D for 
Continental European firms be higher than non-R&D firms but lower than innovative firms 
domiciled in the UK other things being equal, because in Anglo-Saxon economies 
institutional investors put more pressure on managers and are more unwilling to accept 
short term losses which are frequent in hi-tech sectors (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006). They 
might suffer from a so-called “myopic” view, which forces them to overreact by selling 
loser stocks and buying winners. In bank-based countries, inside shareholders are more 
inclined to accept long-term investments; they do not tend to frequently calibrate their 
portfolios following periodical information from firm managers, hence the stock variability 
should be lower. Sias (1996) and Bushee and Noe (2000) provide empirical evidence that 
higher institutional ownership is associated with higher stock return variability. 
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There is evidence that in several Continental European countries it may exist a size and 
book-to-market effect but the results are still inconclusive. Fama and French (1998b) find 
that their model can explain stock returns in cross-country evidence even for European 
markets. Value stocks with high BM ratio outperform growth stocks in twelve out of 
thirteen international markets. Similar results are found for France by Lajili-Jarjir (2007), 
and Chahine (2008). However, Malin and Veeraraghavan (2004) do not reach the same 
results comparing the UK with France and German markets. They evidence a small size 
effect in France and Germany, but no value effect for the markets investigated. 
Previous research have also offered an alternative explanation of R&D mispricing 
suggesting that it could derive from a failure of investors to control for a non-diversifiable 
source of risk intrinsic of this asset that cannot be captured by other factors. The 
modulating effect of R&D in the Fama and French model (1993) for Continental European 
firms should not be different to that observed in the US or UK, due to similar risk 
characteristics of highly innovative firms in US and Western Europe. 
In order to detect the mispricing of R&D on the stock market and a potential impact of 
R&D on stock returns, I initially follow the approach of Lev and Sougiannis (1996, 1999). 
I regress in cross-section for each country future stock returns on R&D expenses or R&D 
capital after controlling for market beta, firm size and firm market-to-book ratio. The 
model is the following: 
 
ܴ௜,௧ା଺ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܮ݊(ܴܦ/ܯܧ)௜,௧ + ߙଶܾ݁ݐܽ௜,௧ + ߙଷܮ݊(ܯܧ)௜,௧ + ߙସܮ݊(ܤܯ)௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ା଺ 
 
Where: 
Ri,t+6 is the stock return of firm i 6 months after financial statements for year t have 
been disclosed to the market. This usually happens at the end of June of every year. Firm 
betas have been calculated following the approach of Fama and French (1992) on 24 to 60 
monthly returns in the 5 years before end of June of year t. RDi,t is the annual R&D 
expenditure for firm i in year t. MEi,t is the market capitalization of firm i at the end of year 
t. BMi,t is the book-to-market ratio for firm i in year t. Then monthly regressions from 1999 
to 2010 are run following the Fama and MacBeth (1973) model. 
(15)          
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In the second step of the analysis I check for abnormal excess returns of high R&D 
stocks. Previous methods which consist in controlling for size and book-to-market effects 
are applied (Chan et al. 2001; Chambers et al. 2002). Each stock is assigned to a control 
portfolio based on its size and BM ratio. At the end of June of year t, 25 control portfolios 
are created, by sorting all stocks in 5 ME and then 5 BM groups based on the market 
capitalization and BM ratio of previous year. Then one year and two year excess returns for 
each stock are calculated after assigning them to one of 25 portfolios. Then, all firms are 
sorted in 4 groups based on their RD/ME ratio and non-RD firms are grouped in a separate 
portfolio. One year and two year average excess returns for the five groups are then 
measured.    
Following this step, I control whether there is a potential mispricing of R&D stocks 
deriving from a systematic source of risk that the three factor model of Fama and French 
(1993) cannot capture. SMB and HML portfolios following Fama and French (1993) are 
constructed. Then all firms are sorted on the RD/ME ratio and divided in 5 groups. If there 
is a significant stock mispricing, the regression intercept should be different from zero. The 
time series equation for each portfolio i is the following: 
 
ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߛଵൣݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൧ + ߛଶܵܯܤ௧ + ߛଷܪܯܮ௧ + ߝ௜,௧ 
 
Where ri,t is the stock return of firm i at the end of time t; rf,t is the 1 month risk free 
rate of return on treasury bonds observed in month t; rm,t is the market rate of return at the 
end of month t, SMBt and HMLt are size and book to market portfolios as in Fama and 
French (1993) for each month t. (A list of risk free rates and stock indexes per country 
which were used for calculating the above variables is presented in the Table 4 and 5 in the 
Appendix). 
Finally, the stock volatility is analyzed in order to value whether more innovative 
stocks incorporate more business risk and whether this valuation differs across countries. 
Following Chan et al. (2001), I estimate the effect of R&D on stock variability and control 
for size and BM ratio. The economic rationale of the R&D impact is that more R&D 
intensive firms should be more risky in terms of returns’ variability other things being 
(16)                              
72 
 
equal. A cross-section regression model via the Fama and McBeth (1973) approach is 
used: 
 
ߪ௜,௧ା଺ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܮ݊(ܯܧ)௜,௧ + ߚଶܮ݊(ܤܯ)௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܦ/ܯܧ௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ା଺ 
 
The sample comprised all listed firms of four EU countries: Finland, France, Germany 
and Sweden for years 1999-20097. Financial data for these firms were downloaded from 
Datastream. I decided to concentrate only on these countries because the number of listed 
companies and the number of firms that declared R&D activity for other EU countries was 
not significantly high, hence slope coefficients for regressions would have been seriously 
biased. A sample of UK firms was added for comparison purposes as the UK stock 
exchange comprises the highest number of listed stocks in Europe with a high percentage 
of R&D intensive firms. Afterwards, all financial, insurance and real estate firms were 
dropped from the sample as the financial statements of these firms differ sensibly from 
manufacture companies in terms of leverage, R&D activity, intangibles etc. Firms with 
negative price and book value of equity were eliminated and extreme outliers were 
excluded by winsorizing from above at the 99% level the main variables which are rightly-
skewed. Dedman et al. (2009) use a similar approach for their UK sample. A final check 
was performed in other databases like Bureau Van Dijk in order to find missing data, 
especially for R&D expenditures.  
At the end of this process the final sample comprised 12911 firm-year observations, 
from which only 4755 observations reported R&D activity. The selected stock markets and 
indices for every country are reported in the Appendix.  
 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics and preliminary empirical results 
In Table 15 the distribution of firms per country of domicile is presented. It can be 
observed that the number of firms that on average performed R&D or disclosed it during 
these years is almost never bigger than 55% of the sample for each country. 
 
                                               
7 Stock prices and returns go up to July 2010 
(17)                              
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Table 15 - Number of firm-year observations per country of domicile. 
In column 1 the number of firm-year observations with positive RD/ME over time is reported. Column 2 
comprises the total number of firm-year observations and Column 3 the percentage of positive RD/ME firms 
over the total sample for each country. 
 
Country of domicile R&D firm-year  observations 
Total firm-year 
observations 
R&D %  
on total 
FIN 460 857 53.68% 
FRA 866 2954 29.32% 
GER 1186 3143 37.73% 
SWE 521 1337 38.97% 
UK 1722 4620 37.27% 
 
It was stressed above that the disclosure of R&D is not compulsory across Europe. 
Firms that declare positive R&D ranges from 29.32% of the sample for France to near 38% 
for the UK and Germany and Sweden, and only Finland exceeds 50% perhaps, because the 
Finnish market has less listed firms than others. Larger countries have also the highest 
number of listed firms in the sample. 
In Table 16 descriptive statistics for R&D and non-R&D firms are presented. For every 
country I calculate average measures of Ln(ME), the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization, which accounts for firm size, the BM ratio, the earnings ratio 
(Earnings/Price) and a measure of leverage (Total Debt/Equity) across years 1999-2009. It 
can be observed that R&D firms are larger compared to non-R&D for every country. This 
evidences that R&D disclosure is related to size (Hall and Oriani, 2006). The book-to-
market ratio of R&D firms is lower; innovative firms tend to be growth stocks. Sweden 
and UK firms have the lowest BM ratio (0.390 and 0.469 respectively). The leverage ratio 
is higher for non-R&D firms. French and German firms are the most leveraged, while UK 
firms use more equity. High D/E ratios are common in bank-based countries. Firms finance 
their activities with debt more than their competitors in Anglo-Saxon markets. The fact 
that non-R&D firms use more debt is in line with economic theories which demonstrate 
that R&D activity presents high risks of moral hazard and information asymmetries so it’s 
preferable to finance it by equity (Williamson, 1988; Hall, 2002). Earnings ratio seems to 
be higher on average for non-R&D firms.  
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Table 16 - Descriptive statistics for firms that performed R&D over the period 1999-2009 compared 
with non-R&D firms.  
Ln(ME) is the natural log of market capitalization. BM is the book-to-market ratio. E/P is the earnings-to-
price ratio. D/E is the total debt-to-equity ratio.  
 
 Ln(ME)   BM   E/P   D/E 
Country of domicile 
R&D 
Non 
R&D 
 
R&D 
Non 
R&D 
 
R&D 
Non 
R&D 
 
R&D 
Non 
R&D 
           
FINLAND 13.454 11.073  0.601 0.723  0.048 0.166  0.809 1.162 
FRANCE 12.743 11.419  0.639 0.656  0.063 0.066  0.661 0.667 
GERMANY 13.832 12.148  0.575 0.631  0.061 0.073  0.859 1.348 
SWEDEN 13.434 13.063  0.390 0.691  0.050 0.084  1.117 1.395 
UK 12.475 11.154   0.469 0.727   0.050 0.054   0.807 0.678 
 
 
In Table 17 all firms are classified based on their main sector of operations. As usual, I 
adopted the ICB industrial classification. Firms are not sorted on a country level for not 
having only a few corporations per sector. Moreover, firms’ value drivers are usually 
compared by investors and analysts with firm competitors in different markets, not only in 
firms’ country of domicile.     
All sectors are sorted on their average RD/ME ratio; for each sector I also present its 
BM ratio and Ln(ME) that accounts for average size. The most innovative sectors are the 
same evidenced by previous research on innovation; automobile and parts, technology & 
hardware & equipment, pharmaceuticals & biotech, etc. This is reported for US markets by 
Chan et al. (2001) or Japan by Nguyen (2010). Book-to-market ratios per sector and 
market capitalization are not significantly different; there is not a clear trend across sectors. 
Last, in Table 18 descriptive statistics for average firms’ RD/ME for each country of 
domicile are provided. The mean values are not remarkably different; this is due to the 
deflative effect of ME. The other statistics show a strong value asymmetry; i.e., the median 
is close to zero for almost all countries, much lower than the average values. RD/ME 
values show the highest levels of variability for France and the lowest for the UK. French 
and German firms have the highest levels of RD/ME in absolute values; the UK firms on 
average invest less compared to their market value of equity. 
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Table 17 - Mean values of RD/ME, BM and size per industry. 
All firms have been classified based on the main sector of operations and then sorted by RD/ME. The ICB 
industry classification was adapted. 
 
Sector RD/ME BM Ln(ME) 
     
Automobiles & Parts 13.31% 0.44 20.12 
Software & Computer Services 12.18% 0.61 17.78 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 10.66% 0.47 18.68 
Leisure Goods 9.69% 0.56 18.32 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 9.46% 0.66 19.07 
Health Care Equipment & Services 9.24% 0.59 18.66 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 8.34% 0.70 17.72 
Chemicals 7.13% 0.90 19.56 
Industrial Engineering 7.04% 0.72 18.66 
Aerospace & Defense 6.99% 0.94 20.09 
Oil Equipment, Services & Distribution 4.77% 0.77 20.34 
Support Services 3.77% 0.82 18.57 
Household Goods & Home Construction 3.65% 0.80 18.52 
Alternative Energy 3.34% 0.62 18.43 
General Industrials 3.10% 0.78 19.45 
Food Producers 2.90% 0.87 19.12 
General Retailers 2.87% 0.81 19.10 
Construction & Materials 2.21% 0.88 19.31 
Industrial mining & metals 2.20% 0.91 19.98 
Media 2.19% 0.84 18.92 
Personal Goods 2.03% 0.72 18.39 
Forestry & Paper 1.88% 0.89 20.08 
Beverages 1.50% 0.70 18.49 
Fixed Line Telecommunications 1.19% 0.76 21.33 
Mining 1.05% 0.91 19.56 
Electricity 0.92% 0.82 20.81 
Industrial Transportation 0.78% 0.68 18.61 
Travel & Leisure 0.62% 0.95 19.30 
Mobile Telecommunications 0.49% 0.76 21.19 
Tobacco 0.41% 0.74 23.00 
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 0.37% 0.87 21.21 
Food & Drug Retailers 0.34% 0.84 21.30 
Oil & Gas Producers 0.32% 0.83 21.12 
 
In order to examine whether R&D is a significant factor for explaining future stock 
returns beyond firm beta, size and BM ratio I apply model (15) and regress monthly returns 
on the three variables. 
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Table 18 - Descriptive statistics of RD/ME for the period 1999-2009.  
Firms have been grouped by country of domicile. The 1% and 95% are the 1 percentile and 95 percentile of 
each sample distribution.  
 
Country  
of domicile 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 1% 
percent 
 
Median 
 95% 
percent 
            
FINLAND 0.026  0.061  0.000  0.003  0.122 
FRANCE 0.028  0.104  0.000  0.000  0.147 
GERMANY 0.032  0.090  0.000  0.000  0.163 
SWEDEN 0.028  0.074  0.000  0.000  0.142 
UK 0.022   0.071   0.000   0.000   0.105 
 
 
The regression is run monthly from June 2000 to June 2010 following the methodology 
of Fama and MacBeth (1973). Previous research for US markets (Lev and Sougiannis, 
1996; 1999) has evidenced that the introduction of a measure of R&D helps improving the 
significance of the basic model introduced by Fama and French (1992). If the impact of 
R&D on stock returns is significant, there exists a potential mispricing effect of R&D 
expenditures. 
As previously discussed, stock returns for firm i start six months after the end of the 
previous fiscal year. Six months are necessary for investors to incorporate in their 
expectations accounting information from previous year’s financial statements. Empirical 
results are presented in Table 19. 
The results indicate that the market model has not a significant predictive power for 
future stock returns. Firm beta is never significant and close to zero for all countries for the 
period considered. Fama and French (1992) evidence that the relationship between beta 
and stock returns disappears in the US markets during the 1969-1990 period. I confirm 
here this result for European markets for years 1999-2009. Firm size has a negative and 
significant effect at the 1% level on returns only for Germany and the UK (βGER = -0.003, 
t-test = -3.69, βUK = -0.003, t-test = -4.06). It is not significant for Sweden and France and 
only significant at the 10% level for Finland. 
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Table 19 - Cross-sectional regressions of monthly future stock returns on RD/ME 
The sample period goes from July 2000 to July 2010. Ln(ME) is the natural log. of market capitalization. 
Beta is estimated from the market model using past 60 month returns. Ln(BM) is the natural log of book-to-
market ratio. T-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
  FIN FRA GER SWE UK 
         
β -0.005 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 
  [-0.98] [-0.45] [-0.01] [0.42] [0.03] 
Ln(ME) -0.002* 0.001 -0.003*** 0.002 -0.003*** 
  [-1.82] [1.62] [-3.69] [1.41] [-4.06] 
Ln(BM) 0.007* 0.004 0.007** 0.011** 0.008*** 
  [1.74] [0.89] [2.01] [2.59] [3.72] 
Ln(RD/ME) 0.002 -0.001 0.003*** -0.002 0.002** 
  [0.70] [-0.63] [3.17] [-0.82] [2.54] 
Intercept -0.040* -0.032* -0.052*** -0.065* -0.054*** 
  [-1.67] [-1.74] [-2.80] [-1.77] [-3.04] 
         
N 4032 7559 10320 4566 16024 
R2 0.38 0.31 0.20 0.46 0.37 
 
Notes: * indicate levels of significance (*** pv< 1%, ** pv< 5%; * pv< 10%). 
 
The BM ratio is positive for all countries but significant at the 5% level only for 
Germany, Sweden and UK. The R&D variable helps in improving the predictability of the 
model only for Germany and UK (βGER = 0.003, t-test = 3.17, βUK = 0.002, t-test = 2.54). 
The overall R2 is not considerably high for all countries. 
The loadings on the R&D are similar to those evidenced by Lev and Sougiannis (1999) 
for the US market. The empirical results evidence that R&D can be a good predictor for 
future stock returns, but not for all European countries. Previous evidence for size and BM 
effect in the UK is confirmed. 
 
 
5.3 R&D and portfolio abnormal returns 
In the previous section,I showed that there is a positive relationship between R&D and 
future stock returns for two out of five countries under observation. I test in the following 
whether investors correctly price firm shares or there is evidence that confirms a possible 
mispricing of R&D investment across Europe. In order to detect average excess returns the 
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procedure described in Fama and French (1993) is followed. At the end of June of each 
year t in the period 1999-2009, stocks for each country sample are allocated to five size 
portfolios using stock capitalization breakpoints (ME). Then, stocks in each size quintile 
are sorted in five BM portfolios using the book-to-market ratio of the end of year t-1.All 
portfolios are annually rebalanced. Every stock is matched to a “benchmark” portfolio 
which has similar size and book-to-market ratio. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are 
calculated in June of every year for the next one or two years as the difference between 
every stock’s returns and the returns of its matched portfolio. At the end, stocks are ranked 
in four groups based in their RD/ME ratio and average one year and two year excess 
returns are calculated for each group. Non-R&D firms are grouped separately. 
Table 20 reports average abnormal returns for roughly four equal groups based on the 
ratio of R&D to ME, where group one is the less R&D-intensive and group four the most 
innovative. In row one and two of Table 20, abnormal returns for one year and two year 
buy-and-hold portfolios are presented.  
The results generally reveal that portfolio excess returns increase with respect to 
RD/ME. They are superior to their matched size and book-to-market portfolios for the first 
and second year after portfolio formation and this is confirmed for every country. The top 
R&D-intensive groups have the highest excess returns for every country. The highest 
returns are observed for Finland (18.33% and 6.11% respectively in year 1 and 2), and 
France (18.45% and 9.14%) and Germany (10.99% and 7.79%). In these three countries 
mispricing seems to be persistent because it is strengthened in the second year. In the other 
two countries we observe overvaluation for the lowest R&D groups especially in the 
Sweden case, but the trend reverses in the second year. The mispricing of top R&D groups 
for UK firms is lower compared to the other countries (0.52% for the first year and 1.05% 
for the second). Non-R&D firms do not have a clear pattern across different markets. 
Generally they are undervalued compared to top-R&D firms with the exception again of 
Sweden and UK.  
Generally, these results confirm a pronounced undervaluation of R&D stocks, 
especially for the top-quintile R&D groups in France, Finland and Germany and a potential 
overvaluation for Sweden in the first year after portfolio formation.  
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Table 20 - Excess returns for R&D-sorted portfolios 
Firms are ranked and sorted in four portfolios in July of each year t based on the RD/ME ratio of year t-1. 
Non-R&D firms are grouped separately. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are calculated for the first and 
second year after portfolio formation and averaged. Size and BM control portfolios are created in each July of 
year t splitting each country sample in five quintiles on market capitalization and then five quintiles of BM 
ratio. BM is the average book-to-market ratio of equity for each portfolio. Ln(ME) is market capitalization 
(logged). E/P is the earnings-to-price ratio. 
 
  Non-
R&D Q1 (low) Q2 Q3 Q4 (high) 
FIN           
1 year excess returns 5.51% -6.49% -3.79% 2.87% 18.33% 
2 year excess returns 4.03% -2.71% 0.48% 1.27% 6.11% 
BM 0.656 0.749 0.703 0.668 0.557 
Ln(ME) 18.286 21.184 20.001 19.486 18.253 
E/P 6.65% 7.43% 6.37% 5.20% 4.89% 
       
FRA      
1 year excess returns 5.54% -0.85% 3.27% 10.20% 18.45% 
2 year excess returns 2.90% 1.34% 2.12% 7.63% 9.14% 
BM 0.797 0.660 0.620 0.643 0.597 
Ln(ME) 18.587 21.615 20.253 19.870 19.113 
E/P 11.15% 6.46% 6.92% 6.11% 5.95% 
       
GER      
1 year excess returns 2.89% -15.68% 1.53% -1.31% 10.99% 
2 year excess returns 0.49% -8.26% 7.14% -1.55% 7.79% 
BM 0.764 0.879 0.601 0.591 0.524 
Ln(ME) 18.018 21.093 20.459 19.764 19.366 
E/P 8.68% 6.73% 6.47% 6.24% 5.31% 
       
SWE      
1 year excess returns -16.28% -14.94% -4.24% -7.49% -1.06% 
2 year excess returns -12.68% -2.58% 1.88% 2..78% 2.49% 
BM 0.573 0.745 0.540 0.433 0.322 
Ln(ME) 18.067 20.787 20.393 19.624 18.294 
E/P 5.42% 6.14% 6.02% 4.91% 3.56% 
       
UK      
1 year excess returns 2.50% -0.71% -0.19% -0.24% 0.52% 
2 year excess returns 3.85% -5.44% -2.93% -1.48% 1.05% 
BM 0.661  0.805 0.669 0.476 0.465 
Ln(ME) 18.778 21.069 19.512 18.757 17.843 
E/P 7.59% 6.93% 6.13% 5.79% 5.25% 
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We do not observe a significant mispricing in UK. This can enforce the view that in 
Continental Europe more innovative firms can suffer mispricing due to high information 
asymmetries compared to value stocks. Investors in these countries find it difficult to 
correctly adjust their expectations about future cash flows related to R&D investment. In 
the UK mispricing is much lower due to higher transparency of financial statements and 
lower information risk. It can be observed that mispricing is low even for Sweden firms. 
Sweden financial and legal environment and corporate governance is similar to that of 
other Continental Europe countries i.e. Germany. Nevertheless, it has some peculiarities in 
terms of voluntary disclosure towards investors that make it more transparent compared to 
other Continental European Countries. Cooke (1989) and Grey and Skogsvik (2004) have 
evidenced that listed firms in Sweden opt for voluntary disclosure to give positive signals 
to the markets about their future performance. This is more pronounced in sectors like 
Pharmaceuticals where the R&D intensity is higher. Hence, disclosure helps investors to 
assess conservative measurement biases in the accounting numbers and facilitates 
predictions of future cash flows, reducing stock mispricing.   
In rows three to five of Table 20 average values for key variables across RD/ME 
quintiles are presented. Generally, top-R&D firms have lower market capitalization; this is 
confirmed for all countries of the sample. Firm BM ratios are lower for most innovative 
stocks. The economic literature has shown that growth stocks with low BM ratios are 
usually those that innovate more than others; this is reflected in high stock prices compared 
to book value of equity (Lakonishok et al. 1994; Chan et al. 2001). The same rationale 
seems to guide to E/P ratio which is inversely proportionate to the RD/ME across all 
countries.  
The results highlighted in Table 20 indicate a potential mispricing for most innovative 
stocks in Continental Europe. Investors tend to overvalue firms with a lower RD/ME ratio, 
but seem to have lower expectations on future cash flows for highly innovative firms. In 
this case undervaluation is common across all countries, although it is weaker for the UK 
and Sweden. These outcomes indirectly support previous research which has evidenced 
that in Continental Europe information asymmetries are higher; mispricing is more 
pronounced for highly innovative firms in these countries as they should suffer more from 
this issue.  
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5.4 R&D expenditures and systematic risk 
In the previous section it can be noticed that stock mispricing is positively influenced by 
R&D intensity across different countries. It might be possible that this non correct 
valuation by investors reflects an additional source of risk for R&D expenditures not 
exhaustively captured by the BM or the size effect. To address this issue, I use the multi-
factor model of Fama and French (1993) after sorting each country’s sample by a measure 
of R&D intensity.  
At the end of June of each year from 2000 to 2010, every country sample is sorted by 
market capitalization and stocks are allocated to two size groups (small and big, S and B) 
based on whether firm market equity is below or above the median. Stocks are also 
allocated independently from the first sort in three book-to-market groups, low (L), median 
(M) and high (H). Six portfolios are created from the intersection of size and BM groups 
(S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L, B/M, B/H) and value-weighted returns are calculated from July of 
year t till June of year t+1. Portfolios are rebalanced in June of each year t, so the book-to 
market of year t-1 is known (Fama and French, 1993). The SMB portfolio is the simple 
monthly average between returns on S/L, S/M, S/H portfolios and returns on B/L, B/M, 
B/H portfolios. It attempts to measure the effect of size since the BM effect should be 
nullified from the difference. In the same way, HML is the monthly average of the 
difference between returns of S/H, B/H and returns of S/L and B/L portfolios. It represents 
the book-to-market risk factor.  
The country samples are then sorted by RD/ME and divided in 4 groups (1 being the 
less R&D intensive and 4 the top quartile). Non-R&D firms are allocated to a separated 
portfolio. Portfolios are created every June of year t, and returns are calculated for the next 
12 months. Then Fama and French (1993) model is applied. I recall it here for 
convenience: 
 
ݎ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜ + ߛଵൣݎ௠,௧ − ݎ௙,௧൧ + ߛଶܵܯܤ௧ + ߛଷܪܯܮ௧ + ߝ௜,௧ 
  
Where ri,t is the average monthly return for portfolio i; rf,t is the one month risk-free 
rate of return for each country in month t, rm,t is the market value-weighted return for 
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month t8. For each country I have 128 monthly observations spanning from 1999 to July 
2010. This model should capture all variations in firm excess returns. If the intercept is 
significantly different from zero, there is a high possibility that R&D might actually induce 
a not correct valuation of firm stock returns due to firms’ systematic risk. The results are 
presented in Table 21. 
                                               
8 Risk free rates and market indices used in this section are listed in the Appendix. 
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Table 21 – Risk-adjusted returns on portfolios sorted on RD/ME 
Portfolios are created in each July of year t and rebalanced every year based on accounting information of previous year. Rm is the return on the value-weighted 
market index. Rf is the risk-free rate of return. Rm-Rf is the monthly excess return of the specified market index. SMB and HML are the monthly returns on the two 
portfolios which proxy for size and BM risk. The sample period goes from July 2000 to June 2010 (128 months). Non-R&D firms are grouped separately for each 
country. The risk free rates and the market indexes used are listed in Table 4 and 5 in the Appendix. 
  
FIN FRA GER SWE UK 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Rm-Rf 0.841*** 1.001*** 0.915*** 0.916*** 0.953*** 1.126*** 1.064*** 0.974*** 1.111*** 1.108*** 1.184*** 1.033*** 0.865*** 0.913*** 1.023*** 0.964*** 0.924*** 1.085*** 1.015*** 0.963*** 
  [35.97] [23.17] [17.28] [12.56] [42.47] [31.42] [27.83] [20.82] [30.59] [35.37] [38.95] [27.56] [29.62] [40.07] [35.11] [23.77] [25.31] [24.44] [23.02] [14.62] 
SMB 0.717*** 0.523*** 0.633*** 0.744*** 0.004 0.0676 -0.0122 0.098 0.450*** 0.350*** 0.580*** 0.525*** 0.197*** 0.290*** 0.215*** 1.033*** 0.401*** 0.614*** 0.738*** 0.770*** 
  [21.19] [9.01] [8.90] [7.59] [0.09] [0.97] [-0.16] [1.05] [10.26] [9.09] [15.52] [11.40] [3.94] [7.44] [4.35] [15.12] [12.04] [15.16] [18.33] [12.82] 
HML 0.001 0.212*** 0.128*** 0.0232 -0.0016 -0.031 0.006 0.003 -0.23*** -0.036 0.371*** 0.100*** 0.533*** 0.368*** 0.214*** 0.0358 -0.06** -0.008 -0.0208 -0.0674 
  [0.04] [6.73] [3.33] [0.44] [-0.08] [-0.98] [0.17] [0.07] [-5.36] [-0.93] [4.59] [6.51] [14.30] [12.65] [5.21] [0.58] [-2.08] [-0.21] [-0.54] [-1.17] 
Intercept -0.07*** -0.007** -0.006* -0.005 -0.004 0.008** 0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.01*** -0.006* -0.010** -0.007 -0.08*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
  [-4.15] [-2.31] [-1.75] [-1.00] [-1.55] [2.25] [0.97] [-0.69] [-1.44] [-1.45] [-0.42] [-0.38] [-2.66] [-1.87] [-2.56] [-1.38] [-3.66] [-0.79] [-0.60] [-0.80] 
                       
N 128 122 122 122 122 121 122 122 121 122 122 122 122 122 121 120 122 122 122 122 
Adj. R2       0.72        0.82        0.71        0.58        0.84        0.89        0.87        0.78        0.81        0.73        0.74        0.88        0.80        0.84        0.83        0.80        0.88        0.79        0.79        0.78  
 
Non-R&D portfolios per country 
 FIN FRA GER SWE UK 
Rm-Rf 0.869*** 0.820*** 0.768*** 0.873*** 0.917*** 
  [19.02] [30.69] [51.83] [50.39] [32.71] 
SMB 0.343*** -0.0843 0.675*** 0.719*** 0.721*** 
  [5.58] [-1.57] [37.37] [23.92] [27.44] 
HML 0.160*** -0.009 -0.051*** -0.153*** -0.040 
  [4.80] [-0.38] [-2.81] [-6.84] [-1.60] 
Intercept -0.004 -0.005 -0.01*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
  [-1.24] [-1.63] [-7.64] [-3.58] [-5.23] 
N 122 128 127 128 128 
Adj. R2 0.77 0.89 0.77 0.78 0.84 
Notes: * indicate levels of significance (*** pv< 1%, ** pv< 5%; * pv< 10%). 
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The results evidence that the three factor model explains a high proportion of the time 
series variation in returns for all five portfolios. Adjusted R-squares are indeed very high. 
They are never lower than 70% with the only exception of the top quartile in the Finland 
sample. The loading for the market factor is generally high and close to unity across 
countries and R&D portfolios. It is always significant at the 1% level. Abnormal returns 
are not so common across the results. We observe negative and significant intercepts in the 
lowest quartiles for Finland (αQ1= -0.007, αQ2= -0.006, αQ3= -0.006) and Sweden (αQ1= -
0.011, αQ2= -0.006, αQ3= -0.010). This common trend can be due to the positive correlation 
of two Scandinavian countries (the correlation between stock returns during the period 
under observation for Sweden and Finland is 0.46). In the other countries we notice a 
significant underpricing for France Q2 portfolio (αQ2= 0.008) and overpricing for the UK 
Q1 portfolio (αQ1= -0.008). Non-R&D portfolios suffer overvaluation but this is significant 
only for Germany, Sweden and UK.  
The overall picture seems to indicate no significant risk based excess returns for top 
R&D sorted portfolios for France, Germany and UK and significant albeit low overpricing 
for Finland and Sweden. The size portfolio carries a positive loading when significant and 
this is verified for all countries except France. The coefficients when positive confirm the 
result for every level of significance. Moreover there exists a positive trend from low R&D 
portfolios to top quartiles. High RD/ME firms have lower size and this is reflected in 
higher SML coefficients for more R&D intensive firms because they are supposed to be 
more risky. The book-to-market variable has not a clear trend across countries and R&D 
sorted portfolios. It is positive and significant for Finland (Q2, Q3), Germany (Q3 and Q4) 
and Sweden (Q1, Q2, Q3). It is generally not significant for France and UK. However, 
when significant, the BM factor decreases when RD/ME increases due to lower BM ratios 
for most innovative firms. The results for UK data confirm previous research by Al-Horani 
et al. (2003) and Dedman et al. (2009) which posit that the size variable has a positive 
effect and positive trend when RD/ME increases. They also find evidence that when firms 
are grouped by a measure of R&D intensity the BM impact is not straightforward. This 
may be due to the fact that R&D often subsumes to the BM risk factor (Lev and 
Sougiannis, 1999).  
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In order to perform an additional check on the risk assessment of R&D expenditures I 
follow Chan et al. (2001) and apply the three factor model during down and up markets 
separately. During the former, the market return is lower than the risk free rate, while in 
the second case it is higher. I aim to test whether there exist a possible over or 
undervaluation during different economic phases and whether this depends on firm R&D 
intensity. 
Several authors have emphasized that value and growth stocks perform differently in 
bull and bearish markets. Lakonishok et al. (1994, 2004) find that value strategies 
outperform glamour stocks in different time periods even during recessions. This is due to 
an overvaluation of growth stocks; investors seem to overestimate future growth rates of 
these firms based on their past history as winners. Chiao et al. (2008) find that top R&D 
sorted portfolios earn greater abnormal returns during expansion phases and perform worse 
compared to low R&D portfolios during recessions. Xu and Zhang (2004) and Ngyuen et 
al. (2010) find that R&D firms in Japan tend to outperform low R&D firms but only in 
bearish markets. 
The results show that in European countries the effect of the economic cycle doesn’t 
influence under- (over-) valuation of R&D sorted portfolios. The empirical evidence is 
similar to that for the entire sample and I do not tabulate the results in order to save space. 
 
 
5.5 Overall variability for R&D intensive firms 
Prior research has provided evidence that R&D activity is generally more risky due to a 
high level of information asymmetries and moral hazard (Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995), 
the output of R&D investment is highly uncertain and profits are far from assured. These 
issues should be reflected on higher firm stock return variability. Chan et al. (2001) for the 
US and Zu and Zhang (2004) for Japan, have shown that the returns’ variability positively 
depends from research and development expenditures along with a set of controlling 
variables. In this section I apply a similar approach to theirs and estimate a linear cross 
section regression of the form (model 17): 
 
ߪ௜,௧ା଺ = ߙଵ + ߚଵܮ݊(ܯܧ)௜,௧ + ߚଶܮ݊(ܤܯ)௜,௧ + ߚଷܴܦ/ܯܧ௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ା଺ 
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At the end of June of each year t, the stock variance for each firm for the next 12 
months is calculated. All stocks per country (performing R&D or not) are included in the 
sample. The square root of stocks’ returns variance is defined as the total risk for firm i, in 
year t. This variable is regressed on a measure of firm size (Ln(ME)), book-to-market ratio 
(Ln(BM)) and RD/ME. The Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology for estimating the 
regression coefficients is used again. The results are exhibited in Table 22.  
 
Table 22 - Cross-sectional regressions of monthly future stock volatility on RD/ME 
Stock volatility is measured in July of each year t based on accounting information of previous year. It is the 
standard deviation of monthly returns for 12 months going from July of year t at June of year t+1. The 
sample period goes from July 2000 to July 2010. Ln(ME) is the natural log. of market capitalization. Beta is 
estimated from the market model using past 60 month returns. Ln(BM) is the natural log of book-to-market 
ratio. T-statistics are in parenthesis 
 
  FIN FRA GER SWE UK 
         
Ln(ME) -0.003*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.020*** -0.010*** 
  [-8.20] [-22.48] [-17.49] [-16.56] [-38.52] 
Ln(BM) -0.013*** -0.030*** -0.018*** -0.037*** -0.020*** 
  [-7.48] [-8.16] [-4.18] [-8.74] [-9.14] 
Ln(RD/ME) 0.122*** 0.153*** 0.206*** 0.115*** 0.230*** 
  [11.92] [13.64] [20.05] [15.59] [10.39] 
Intercept 0.152*** 0.353*** 0.405*** 0.636*** 0.295*** 
  [19.09] [36.21] [27.76] [21.01] [49.40] 
         
N 763 2611 2785 1188 4059 
R2 0.27 0.33 0.43 0.41 0.40 
 
Notes: * indicate levels of significance (*** pv< 1%, ** pv< 5%; * pv< 10%). 
 
As expected, the size variable negatively impacts stock variability, larger firms are also 
less volatile. I obtain the same results for the book-to-market ratio. Value stocks are 
usually firms operating in mature sectors with a low level of uncertainty which is reflected 
in lesser stock variability. Lakonishok et al. (1994) achieve similar outcomes for US firms. 
The R&D variable is positive and significant for all countries. The loadings range from 
0.122 (t-test = 11.92) for Finland to 0.230 (t-test = 15.59) for the UK. These outcomes 
confirm the initial expectations that stock variability is positively influenced by R&D 
expenditures. Further, I find that Continental Europe firms are less volatile than UK firms. 
The greater stock variability of UK firms is consistent with previous research which has 
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related high volatility of traded shares with the widespread presence of institutional 
investors among firm shareholders (Potter, 1992; Bushee and Nee, 2000). Institutions are 
more sensitive than other type of investors to short-term firm results with little interest in 
long-term capital appreciation. They could suffer firm’s strong commitment to R&D 
investment because these companies tend to have lower earnings in the short-term. It can 
be observed from Table 20 that this is the case; E/P ratios of highly R&D intensive firms 
are lower than less innovative ones, other things being equal.  
 
 
5.6 Robustness checks: Using a measure of R&D stock in cross section regressions 
In the following, I test whether the results achieved using R&D annual expenditures 
are still consistent after a measure of R&D stock is used. This variable has been largely 
used in the literature and many authors have evidenced its impact on firm market value 
(Griliches, 1988; Hall and Oriani, 2006; Pindado et al., 2010). The R&D capital is created 
artificially because firms completely expense R&D in the year it is incurred. I construct it 
following the intuition of Griliches (1981). This method is based on a standard perpetual 
inventory equation with declining balance depreciation: 
 
																																					Κ१ = 	 (1 − ߜ)Κ१ିଵ	 + 	ℛ१                                        (18) 
 
where Kt is the end-of-period stock of R&D capital and Rt are the annual R&D 
expenditures during the year t. The depreciation rate ߜ is chosen to be 15 percent per year 
although Griliches and Mairesse (1981) found that the exact choice of depreciation rate 
make little difference in production function estimates. The initial stock of R&D 
expenditures is set equal to the value of R&D at the first year divided by the depreciation 
rate, summed with a growth rate of new R&D of 8% per year (Hall, 1990).  Accordingly, I 
re-estimate regression (15) in cross-section: 
 
ܴ௜,௧ା଺ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵܮ݊(ܴܦܥ/ܯܧ)௜,௧ + ߙଶܾ݁ݐܽ௜,௧ + ߙଷܮ݊(ܯܧ)௜,௧ + ߙସܮ݊(ܤܯ)௜,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ା଺ 
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The results are evidenced in Table 23. It can be observed that the slope coefficients are 
in line with those derived from the previous regressions where a flow variable of R&D was 
used.  
 
Table 23 - Cross-sectional regressions of monthly future stock returns on the R&D capital to ME ratio 
The sample period goes from July 2000 to July 2010. Ln(ME) is the natural log. of market capitalization. 
Beta is estimated from the market model using past 60 month returns. Ln(BM) is the natural log of book-to-
market ratio. T-statistics are in parenthesis. RDC is the R&D capital estimated using the standard perpetual 
inventory method. Ln(RDC/ME) is the natural log of RDC/ME ratio.  
 
  FIN FRA GER SWE UK 
         
β -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 0.013** 0.001 
  [-0.38] [-0.59] [-0.46] [2.20] [0.44] 
Ln(ME) -0.004* 0.001 -0.003*** 0.002 -0.003*** 
  [-1.69] [1.09] [-3.19] [1.11] [-3.69] 
Ln(BM) 0.001 0.011** 0.009* 0.011* 0.008*** 
  [0.26] [2.48] [1.74] [1.85] [3.07] 
Ln(RDC/ME) 0.001 0.003* 0.002** -0.003 0.002** 
  [0.09] [1.98] [2.02] [-0.88] [2.00] 
Intercept -0.064 -0.025 -0.057*** -0.076* -0.058*** 
  [-1.65] [-1.22] [-2.70] [-1.77] [-3.13] 
         
N 1647 4414 6361 2335 11728 
R2 0.34 0.25 0.23 0.43 0.38 
 
Notes: * indicate levels of significance (*** pv< 1%, ** pv< 5%; * pv< 10%). 
 
 
 
5.7 The modulating effect of the industry sector on R&D mispricing 
In the previous sections it was evidenced how R&D can contribute to the prediction of 
future stock returns together with size and BM ratio. However, this effect is not 
straightforward across all countries. In the following, I check whether the propensity to 
innovate of firms’ industry sectors can modulate this effect. Prior studies have shown that 
mispricing may be driven by the sector in which firms operate. Chiao et al. (2008) show 
that the R&D impact is more important for firms operating in the electronics industry in 
Taiwan compared to non-electronics firms. Al-Horani et al. (2003), offer empirical 
evidence for UK data that the risk premia generated by an R&D addendum in the Fama 
and French model is much higher for high-tech firms belonging to electronics, software 
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and health industries. Ciftci et al. (2011) find that firms tend to earn excess returns when 
they have an above-the-average R&D intensity ratio compared to other competitors in the 
same industry sector. The aforementioned papers indicate that sector R&D intensity is the 
threshold for evaluating firm innovativeness. I partially follow this path as I sort all firms 
in the sample based on their main sector of operations. At the end of June of each year 
industry sectors were sorted and divided into three groups based on their R&D intensity 
over the period 1999-2009.  
 
Table 24 - Cross-sectional regressions of monthly future stock returns on the RD/ME ratio per sector 
based on firm R&D intensity 
The sample period goes from July 2000 to July 2010. At the end of July of each year t stocks for all countries 
are ranked based on the last available RD/ME ratio and sorted in three groups. The most R&D intensive firms 
are named as hi-tech. The middle group is named med-tech and the less innovative firms are included in the 
low-tech sample. For each group stock returns are estimated based on the accounting information of year t-1. 
Ln(ME) is the natural log. of market capitalization. Beta is estimated from the market model using past 60 
month returns. Ln(BM) is the natural log of book-to-market ratio. T-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
 Hi tech Med tech Low tech 
    
β 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 [0.17] [-0.28] [0.24] 
Ln(ME) -0.003*** -0.002** 0.001 
 [-3.26] [-2.42] [1.22] 
Ln(BM) 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 
 [3.20] [2.79] [2.68] 
Ln(RD/ME) 0.003*** 0.002* -0.001 
 [3.21] [1.68] [-0.58] 
Intercept -0.044*** -0.033** -0.024 
 [-2.71] [-2.01] [-1.09] 
 
   
N 17377 13821 11303 
R2 0.51 0.65 0.39 
 
Notes: * indicate levels of significance (*** pv< 1%, ** pv< 5%; * pv< 10%). 
 
The hi-tech group comprises all firms with RD/ME ratio over 4.77%, the med-tech 
companies have a RD/ME ratio that ranges from 1.88% to 4.77% and the low-tech firms 
lower than 1.88%. The number of firms in each group is 135, 107 and 88 respectively. I 
decided to not split the sample at a country level as this would have produced biases results 
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due to the low number of firms in single countries. First, the R&D predictive power is 
tested by applying model (13). The results are presented in Table 24. 
The impact of R&D on future stock returns is positive and significant only for the hi-
tech firms (Ln(RD/ME) = 0.003, t-test = 3.21), while it loses its predictive power for less 
innovative firms. The results show that mispricing is more likely to occur for highly R&D 
intensive firms.  
In Table 25 excess returns for sector portfolios based on their R&D intensity are 
calculated. It can be observed that excess returns are higher for top RD/ME firms. Further, 
the undervaluation is more marked for highly RD/ME intensive sectors, while it lowers 
considerably when less innovative industries are considered. This enforces the view that 
industry sector can significantly impact R&D mispricing. 
 
Table 25 - R&D and one year sector excess returns 
In this table excess returns for one year buy-and-hold sector portfolios are evidenced. All firms are grouped 
in sectors based on their ICB code in July of every year. Average cumulative returns are calculated for the 
next 12 months after portfolio formation. Then all firms are sorted based on their RD/ME and divided on four 
groups where group one has the lowest RD/ME ratio and four the highest. Excess returns are then calculated 
as the average return of every RD/ME group and its sector benchmark portfolio. The RD/ME column 
indicates average RD/ME ratios for all sectors as in Table 17. 
 
Sector RD/ME 1 (low) 2 3 4 (high) 
Automobiles & Parts 13.31% -5.01% -7.42% -11.24% 3.03% 
Software & Computer Services 12.18% -37.91% -3.54% 5.90% 19.31% 
Technology Hardware & 
Equipment 
10.66% -61.51% -11.45% -3.93% 8.14% 
Leisure Goods 9.69% -18.58% 18.36% 1.11% 10.64% 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 
9.46% -26.88% -4.89% 3.28% 4.01% 
Health Care Equipment & 
Services 
9.24% -32.41% 9.41% 6.00% 27.64% 
Electronic & Electrical 
Equipment 
8.34% -30.97% -6.05% 0.79% 13.18% 
Chemicals 7.13% 4.28% 7.30% -0.21% 1.32% 
Industrial Engineering 7.04% 3.27% -1.38% -0.72% 3.39% 
Aerospace & Defense 6.99% -1.61% 0.23% 3.24% 3.17% 
Oil Equipment, Services & 
Distribution 
4.77% -25.85% 7.94% -5.04% 2.74% 
Support Services 3.77% 0.75% 2.81% 1.75% 1.23% 
Household Goods & Home 
Construction 
3.65% 0.60% -0.46% 5.04% 4.67% 
Alternative Energy 3.34% -20.37% -8.46% 7.75% 3.99% 
General Industrials 3.10% -0.70% -6.70% 2.31% 5.39% 
Food Producers 2.90% 0.12% -0.13% 6.84% 7.72% 
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General Retailers 2.87% 5.71% 3.30% 4.80% 4.37% 
Construction & Materials 2.21% -3.01% -1.34% 5.79% 1.27% 
Industrial mining & metals 2.20% -17.71% -2.36% 4.71% 5.35% 
Media 2.19% -10.70% -9.19% -5.89% 4.66% 
Personal Goods 2.03% -4.72% 6.53% 7.89% 5.52% 
Forestry & Paper 1.88% -14.58% -16.61% 2.60% 2.80% 
Beverages 1.50% 10.39% -16.88% -0.91% 5.41% 
Fixed Line 
Telecommunications 
1.19% -37.53% -2.23% 3.14%  
Mining 1.05% 6.14% 4.10% 5.99% 4.98% 
Electricity 0.92% 9.52% 0.62% 5.39%  
Industrial Transportation 0.78% -14.57% 3.56%   
Travel & Leisure 0.62% -12.27% 8.55% 10.99%  
Mobile Telecommunications 0.49% -3.99% 1.39%   
Tobacco 0.41% 16.18%    
Gas, Water & Multiutilities 0.37% 2.76% 1.00% 6.77%  
Food & Drug Retailers 0.34% -17.09%    
Oil & Gas Producers 0.32% 2.80%    
 
 
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter the effect of R&D on firm stock returns was examined. I investigated 
whether R&D can help predicting future stock returns for a sample of European firms, and 
whether more R&D-intensive portfolios can achieve excess returns compared to size and 
book-to-market benchmark portfolios. The results provide support that R&D can help 
investors to estimate future stock returns but only in two out of five countries, Germany 
and the UK. R&D-intensive firms earn substantial abnormal returns one year and two 
years after portfolio formation. Companies that invest more in R&D have lower market 
capitalization, lower BM ratios and lower E/P ratios. They are typically growth stocks. 
The evidence does not permit to value any mispricing due to the non-correct valuation 
of systematic risk for more innovative firms. However, these firms are usually more risky 
in terms of overall stock volatility compared to those that invest less in R&D. Listed firms 
in UK seem to suffer more this issue, perhaps due to the diffused presence of institutional 
investors among their shareholders. 
Industry sector seem to be once again a powerful driver for modulating R&D 
mispricing as it was in previous chapters for the market valuation of R&D. R&D can help 
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predicting future returns but only for hi-tech firms. These groups on average achieve 
higher abnormal returns compared to companies that operate in less innovative industries. 
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Thesis conclusions and final remarks 
 
Private firm investment in R&D has constantly grown in the last years all over the 
world. Similarly, theoretical and empirical research that tries to assess the effect of 
research and development over firm performance and stock prices has greatly increased 
since the 80ies. Unfortunately, prior contributions on this topic have concentrated mainly 
on US markets and only a few of them have tried to investigate the phenomenon for other 
markets. This thesis tries to partially fill this gap as I consider here Continental European 
firms for a recent period, 1999-2009. 
The main problem that concerns the study of R&D across Europe is that firms are not 
required to disclose this type of information. The other issue is related to the accounting 
treatment of R&D in financial statements. The economic literature considers R&D as an 
asset which generates profits in the long term. The legislators instead, have opted for the 
complete expensing of all R&D outlays in the year when they are incurred since 1974 in 
the US and 1989 for the UK (will small exceptions in the latter case). In Continental 
Europe, the rules are somehow more variegated; basic research is completely expensed 
whereas for development research capitalization is permitted under some circumstances. 
Different authors have highlighted that firms usually expense all R&D due to the difficulty 
to correctly apply this rule. 
In order to study the effect of R&D on stock prices I considered a sample of listed 
firms from six European Countries for the period 1999-2009. Only part of them disclosed 
R&D investment due the issues discussed above. In the first two chapters the effect of 
R&D on firm value was studied and in the last chapter the effect of R&D on stock returns 
was investigated. 
In the first case an accounting based model introduced by Ohlson (1989) was used. The 
rationale of this model is that firm value can be estimated as the present value of 
discounted dividends. The latter can be approximated by firm book value plus expected 
future residual income. R&D expenditures are added in the model as they influence the 
technological progress which helps firms to produce future cash flows. I estimated two 
versions of this model by applying different econometric models which are mainly used for 
panel data. These models correct for fixed effects among firms and then for 
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heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross causality among dependent and independent 
variables. I checked also for possible selecting bias for firms that decide to disclose to the 
market their investment in R&D. In further specifications of the models, other control 
variables were added in order to capture modulating effects related to size, industry, firm 
leverage, financial and legal environment of the countries where firms operate etc. 
I found that R&D has a positive and significant effect on firm value for almost all 
countries with the exception of Italian firms. This effect persists across years and across 
countries. These results are in line with prior research for UK markets. Firms that decide to 
disclose R&D are usually larger in size, operate in hi-tech sectors and have lower leverage. 
The market valuation of R&D is modulated by other variables. It is higher for smaller 
firms which operate in hi-tech sectors and larger for firms that operate in low-R&D 
intensity ones. I evidence that the sector has a key role in this valuation.  
Firms that operate in markets with elevated disclosure and shareholders’ rights have 
also a positive valuation of their R&D expenditures. The interaction between this variable 
and the dummies which represent disclosure quality and the development of financial 
markets is always positive and significant across Europe. 
In the last chapter I test the effect of R&D on stock returns. The results indicate that 
R&D can help in predicting future stock returns for Continental European firms. This can 
be due to a potential mispricing of this asset by investors. Mispricing generates higher 
excess returns for highly intensive R&D sorted portfolios after controlling for size and 
book-to-market ratio. This is verified for all countries. I did not find empirical evidence to 
support the view that investors do not completely control for risk when they value R&D. 
When Fama and French (1993) model is tested for buy-and-hold portfolios based on their 
R&D intensity, little mispricing is evidenced. However, R&D firms are more risky in 
terms of stock volatility, which seems to be higher for UK firms compared to Continental 
Europe. This can be related to the presence of institutional investors among firm 
shareholders in the UK. 
Overall, the results highlighted in the present dissertation indicate that R&D can 
remarkably influence firm value and this should be taken into consideration by investors 
when they value stocks. However, they should consider other factors at the firm and 
country level when comparing company performance ex-ante and ex-post their R&D 
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investment. Highly innovative stocks are more prone to mispricing due to over- and 
undervaluation because they are more risky then other firms and because investors are 
often misled by other firm characteristics and by the past performance of these stocks. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 – Gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP, 1999 and 2009. Cross-country 
comparison 
 
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators Database, June 2011 
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Table 2 – R&D expenditure by performing sectors as a percentage of GERD (Gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D), year 2009. Cross-country comparison 
 
                   Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators Database, June 2011 
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Table 3 – ICB sector classification. Sector and Subsector breakdown 
Sector* Subsector Definition 
   
0530 Oil & Gas Producers 0533 Exploration & Production Companies engaged in the exploration for and drilling, production, 
refining and supply of oil and gas products. 
  0537 Integrated Oil & Gas Integrated oil and gas companies engaged in the exploration for and 
drilling, production, refining, distribution and retail sales of oil and gas 
products. 
0570 Oil Equipment, Services & 
Distribution 
0573 Oil Equipment & Services Suppliers of equipment and services to oil fields and offshore 
platforms, such as drilling, exploration, seismic-information services 
and platform construction. 
  0577 Pipelines Operators of pipelines carrying oil, gas or other forms of fuel. 
Excludes pipeline operators that derive the majority of their revenues 
from direct sales to end users, which are classified under Gas 
Distribution. 
0580 Alternative Energy 0583 Renewable Energy Equipment Companies that develop or manufacture renewable energy equipment 
utilizing sources such as solar, wind, tidal, geothermal, hydro and 
waves. 
  0587 Alternative Fuels Companies that produce alternative fuels such as ethanol, methanol, 
hydrogen and bio-fuels that are mainly used to power vehicles, and 
companies that are involved in the production of vehicle fuel cells 
and/or the development of alternative fuelling infrastructure. 
1350 Chemicals 1353 Commodity Chemicals Producers and distributors of simple chemical products that are 
primarily used to formulate more complex chemicals or products, 
including plastics and rubber in their raw form, fibreglass and 
synthetic fibres. 
  1357 Specialty Chemicals Producers and distributors of finished chemicals for industries or end 
users, including dyes, cellular polymers, coatings, special plastics and 
other chemicals for specialized applications. Includes makers of 
colourings, flavours and fragrances, fertilizers, pesticides, chemicals 
used to make drugs, paint in its pigment form and glass in its 
unfinished form. Excludes producers of paint and glass products used 
for construction, which are classified under Building Materials & 
Fixtures. 
1730 Forestry & Paper 1733 Forestry Owners and operators of timber tracts, forest tree nurseries and 
sawmills. Excludes providers of finished wood products such as 
wooden beams, which are classified under Building Materials & 
Fixtures. 
  1737 Paper Producers, converters, merchants and distributors of all grades of 
paper. Excludes makers of printed forms, which are classified under 
Business Support Services, and manufacturers of paper items such as 
cups and napkins, which are classified under Nondurable Household 
Products. 
1750 Industrial Metals & 
Mining 
1753 Aluminum Companies that mine or process bauxite or manufacture and distribute 
aluminum bars, rods and other products for use by other industries. 
Excludes manufacturers of finished aluminum products, such as 
siding, which are categorized according to the type of end product. 
  1755 Nonferrous Metals Producers and traders of metals and primary metal products other than 
iron, aluminum and steel. Excludes companies that make finished 
products, which are categorized according to the type of end product. 
  1757 Iron & Steel Manufacturers and stockholders of primary iron and steel products 
such as pipes, wires, sheets and bars, encompassing all processes from 
smelting in blast furnaces to rolling mills and foundries. Includes 
companies that primarily mine iron ores. 
1770 Mining 1771 Coal Companies engaged in the exploration for or mining of coal. 
  1773 Diamonds & Gemstones Companies engaged in the exploration for and production of diamonds 
and other gemstones. 
  1775 General Mining Companies engaged in the exploration, extraction or refining of 
minerals not defined elsewhere within the Mining sector. 
  1777 Gold Mining Prospectors for and extractors or refiners of gold-bearing ores. 
  1779 Platinum & Precious Metals Companies engaged in the exploration for and production of platinum, 
silver and other precious metals not defined elsewhere. 
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2350 Construction & Materials 2353 Building Materials & Fixtures Producers of materials used in the construction and refurbishment of 
buildings and structures, including cement and other aggregates, 
wooden beams and frames, paint, glass, roofing and flooring materials 
other than carpets. Includes producers of bathroom and kitchen 
fixtures, plumbing supplies and central air-conditioning and heating 
equipment. Excludes producers of raw lumber, which are classified 
under Forestry. 
  2357 Heavy Construction Companies engaged in the construction of commercial buildings, 
infrastructure such as roads and bridges, residential apartment 
buildings, and providers of services to construction companies, such as 
architects, masons, plumbers and electrical contractors. 
2710 Aerospace & Defense 2713 Aerospace Manufacturers, assemblers and distributors of aircraft and aircraft parts 
primarily used in commercial or private air transport. Excludes 
manufacturers of communications satellites, which are classified under 
Telecommunications Equipment. 
  2717 Defense Producers of components and equipment for the defense industry, 
including military aircraft, radar equipment and weapons. 
2720 General Industrials 2723 Containers & Packaging Makers and distributors of cardboard, bags, boxes, cans, drums, bottles 
and jars and glass used for packaging. 
  2727 Diversified Industrials Industrial companies engaged in three or more classes of business 
within the Industrial industry that differ substantially from each other. 
2730 Electronic & Electrical 
Equipment 
2733 Electrical Components & 
Equipment 
Makers and distributors of electrical parts for finished products, such 
as printed circuit boards for radios, televisions and other consumer 
electronics. Includes makers of cables, wires, ceramics, transistors, 
electric adapters and security cameras. 
  2737 Electronic Equipment Manufacturers and distributors of electronic products used in different 
industries. Includes makers of lasers, smart cards, bar scanners, 
fingerprinting equipment and other electronic factory equipment. 
2750 Industrial Engineering 2753 Commercial Vehicles & 
Trucks 
Manufacturers and distributors of commercial vehicles and heavy 
agricultural and construction machinery, including rail cars, tractors, 
bulldozers, cranes, buses and industrial lawn mowers. Includes non-
military shipbuilders, such as builders of cruise ships and ferries. 
  2757 Industrial Machinery Designers, manufacturers, distributors and installers of industrial 
machinery and factory equipment, such as machine tools, lathes, 
presses and assembly line equipment. Includes makers of pollution 
control equipment, castings, pressings, welded shapes, structural 
steelwork, compressors, pumps, bearings, elevators and escalators. 
2770 Industrial Transportation 2771 Delivery Services Operators of mail and package delivery services for commercial and 
consumer use. Includes courier and logistic services primarily 
involving air transportation. 
  2773 Marine Transportation Providers of on-water transportation for commercial markets, such as 
container shipping. Excludes ports, which are classified under 
Transportation Services, and shipbuilders, which are classified under 
Commercial Vehicles & Trucks. 
  2775 Railroads Providers of industrial railway transportation and railway lines. 
Excludes passenger railway companies, which are classified under 
Travel & Tourism, and manufacturers of rail cars, which are classified 
under Commercial Vehicles & Trucks. 
  2777 Transportation Services Companies providing services to the Industrial Transportation sector, 
including companies that manage airports, train depots, roads, bridges, 
tunnels, ports, and providers of logistic services to shippers of goods. 
Includes companies that provide aircraft and vehicle maintenance 
services. 
  2779 Trucking Companies that provide commercial trucking services. Excludes road 
and tunnel operators, which are classified under Transportation 
Services, and vehicle rental and taxi companies, which are classified 
under Travel & Tourism. 
2790 Support Services 2791 Business Support Services Providers of nonfinancial services to a wide range of industrial 
enterprises and governments. Includes providers of printing services, 
management consultants, office cleaning services, and companies that 
install, service and monitor alarm and security systems. 
  2793 Business Training & 
Employment Agencies 
Providers of business or management training courses and 
employment services. 
  2795 Financial Administration Providers of computerized transaction processing, data communication 
and information services, including payroll, bill payment and 
employee benefit services. 
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  2797 Industrial Suppliers Distributors and wholesalers of diversified products and equipment 
primarily used in the commercial and industrial sectors. Includes 
builders merchants. 
  2799 Waste & Disposal Services Providers of pollution control and environmental services for the 
management, recovery and disposal of solid and hazardous waste 
materials, such as landfills and recycling centres. Excludes 
manufacturers of industrial air and water filtration equipment, which 
are classified under Industrial Machinery. 
3350 Automobiles & Parts 3353 Automobiles Makers of motorcycles and passenger vehicles, including cars, sport 
utility vehicles (SUVs) and light trucks. Excludes makers of heavy 
trucks, which are classified under Commercial Vehicles & Trucks, and 
makers of recreational vehicles (RVs and ATVs), which are classified 
under Recreational Products. 
  3355 Auto Parts Manufacturers and distributors of new and replacement parts for 
motorcycles and automobiles, such as engines, carburetors and 
batteries. Excludes producers of tires, which are classified under Tires. 
  3357 Tires Manufacturers, distributors and retreaters of automobile, truck and 
motorcycle tires. 
3530 Beverages 3533 Brewers Manufacturers and shippers of cider or malt products such as beer, ale 
and stout. 
  3535 Distillers & Vintners Producers, distillers, vintners, blenders and shippers of wine and 
spirits such as whisky, brandy, rum, gin or liqueurs. 
  3537 Soft Drinks Manufacturers, bottlers and distributors of non-alcoholic beverages, 
such as soda, fruit juices, tea, coffee and bottled water.  
3570 Food Producers 3573 Farming & Fishing Companies that grow crops or raise livestock, operate fisheries or own 
nontobacco plantations. Includes manufacturers of livestock feeds and 
seeds and other agricultural products but excludes manufacturers of 
fertilizers or pesticides, which are classified under Specialty 
Chemicals. 
  3577 Food Products Food producers, including meatpacking, snacks, fruits, vegetables, 
dairy products and frozen seafood. Includes producers of pet food and 
manufacturers of dietary supplements, vitamins and related items. 
Excludes producers of fruit juices, tea, coffee, bottled water and other 
non-alcoholic beverages, which are classified under Soft Drinks. 
3720 Household Goods & Home 
Construction 
3722 Durable Household Products Manufacturers and distributors of domestic appliances, lighting, hand 
tools and power tools, hardware, cutlery, tableware, garden equipment, 
luggage, towels and linens.  
  3724 Nondurable Household 
Products 
Producers and distributors of pens, paper goods, batteries, light bulbs, 
tissues, toilet paper and cleaning products such as soaps and polishes. 
  3726 Furnishings Manufacturers and distributors of furniture, including chairs, tables, 
desks, carpeting, wallpaper and office furniture. 
  3728 Home Construction Constructors of residential homes, including manufacturers of mobile 
and prefabricated homes intended for use in one place. 
3740 Leisure Goods 3743 Consumer Electronics Manufacturers and distributors of consumer electronics, such as TVs, 
VCRs, DVD players, audio equipment, cable boxes, calculators and 
camcorders. 
  3745 Recreational Products Manufacturers and distributors of recreational equipment. Includes 
musical instruments, photographic equipment and supplies, RVs, 
ATVs and marine recreational vehicles such as yachts, dinghies and 
speedboats. 
  3747 Toys Manufacturers and distributors of toys and video/computer games, 
including such toys and games as playing cards, board games, stuffed 
animals and dolls. 
3760 Personal Goods 3763 Clothing & Accessories Manufacturers and distributors of all types of clothing, jewelry, 
watches or textiles. Includes sportswear, sunglasses, eyeglass frames, 
leather clothing and goods, and processors of hides and skins. 
  3765 Footwear Manufacturers and distributors of shoes, boots, sandals, sneakers and 
other types of footwear. 
  3767 Personal Products Makers and distributors of cosmetics, toiletries and personal-care and 
hygiene products, including deodorants, soaps, toothpaste, perfumes, 
diapers, shampoos, razors and feminine-hygiene products. Includes 
makers of contraceptives other than oral contraceptives, which are 
classified under Pharmaceuticals. 
3780 Tobacco 3785 Tobacco Manufacturers and distributors of cigarettes, cigars and other tobacco 
products. Includes tobacco plantations. 
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4530 Health Care Equipment & 
Services 
4533 Health Care Providers Owners and operators of health maintenance organizations, hospitals, 
clinics, dentists, opticians, nursing homes, rehabilitation and 
retirement centers. Excludes veterinary services, which are classified 
under Specialized Consumer Services. 
  4535 Medical Equipment Manufacturers and distributors of medical devices such as MRI 
scanners, prosthetics, pacemakers, X-ray machines and other non-
disposable medical devices. 
  4537 Medical Supplies Manufacturers and distributors of medical supplies used by health care 
providers and the general public. Includes makers of contact lenses, 
eyeglass lenses, bandages and other disposable medical supplies.  
4570 Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotechnology 
4573 Biotechnology Companies engaged in research into and development of biological 
substances for the purposes of drug discovery and diagnostic 
development, and which derive the majority of their revenue from 
either the sale or licensing of these drugs and diagnostic tools. 
  4577 Pharmaceuticals Manufacturers of prescription or over-the-counter drugs, such as 
aspirin, cold remedies and birth control pills. Includes vaccine 
producers but excludes vitamin producers, which are classified under 
Food Products. 
5330 Food & Drug Retailers 5333 Drug Retailers Operators of pharmacies, including wholesalers and distributors 
catering to these businesses. 
  5337 Food Retailers & Wholesalers Supermarkets, food-oriented convenience stores and other food 
retailers and distributors. Includes retailers of dietary supplements and 
vitamins. 
5370 General Retailers 5371 Apparel Retailers Retailers and wholesalers specializing mainly in clothing, shoes, 
jewelry, sunglasses and other accessories. 
  5373 Broadline Retailers Retail outlets and wholesalers offering a wide variety of products 
including both hard goods and soft goods. 
  5375 Home Improvement Retailers Retailers and wholesalers concentrating on the sale of home 
improvement products, including garden equipment, carpets, 
wallpaper, paint, home furniture, blinds and curtains, and building 
materials. 
  5377 Specialized Consumer Services Providers of consumer services such as auction houses, day-care 
centres, dry cleaners, schools, consumer rental companies, veterinary 
clinics, hair salons and providers of funeral, lawn-maintenance, 
consumer-storage, heating and cooling installation and plumbing 
services. 
  5379 Specialty Retailers Retailers and wholesalers concentrating on a single class of goods, 
such as electronics, books, automotive parts or closeouts. Includes 
automobile dealerships, video rental stores, dollar stores, duty-free 
shops and automotive fuel stations not owned by oil companies. 
5550 Media 5553 Broadcasting & Entertainment Producers, operators and broadcasters of radio, television, music and 
filmed entertainment. Excludes movie theatres, which are classified 
under Recreational Services. 
  5555 Media Agencies Companies providing advertising, public relations and marketing 
services. Includes billboard providers and telemarketers. 
  5557 Publishing Publishers of information via printed or electronic media. 
5750 Travel & Leisure 5751 Airlines Companies providing primarily passenger air transport. Excludes 
airports, which are classified under Transportation Services. 
  5752 Gambling Providers of gambling and casino facilities. Includes online casinos, 
racetracks and the manufacturers of pachinko machines and casino and 
lottery equipment. 
  5753 Hotels Operators and managers of hotels, motels, lodges, resorts, spas and 
campgrounds. 
  5755 Recreational Services Providers of leisure facilities and services, including fitness centers, 
cruise lines, movie theatres and sports teams. 
  5757 Restaurants & Bars Operators of restaurants, fast-food facilities, coffee shops and bars. 
Includes integrated brewery companies and catering companies.  
  5759 Travel & Tourism Companies providing travel and tourism related services, including 
travel agents, online travel reservation services, automobile rental 
firms and companies that primarily provide passenger transportation, 
such as buses, taxis, passenger rail and ferry companies. 
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6530 Fixed Line 
Telecommunications 
6535 Fixed Line 
Telecommunications 
Providers of fixed-line telephone services, including regional and 
long-distance. Includes companies that primarily provide telephone 
services through the internet. Excludes companies whose primary 
business is Internet access, which are classified under Internet. 
6570 Mobile 
Telecommunications 
6575 Mobile Telecommunications Providers of mobile telephone services, including cellular, satellite and 
paging services. Includes wireless tower companies that own, operate 
and lease mobile site towers to multiple wireless service providers. 
7530 Electricity 7535 Conventional Electricity Companies generating and distributing electricity through the burning 
of fossil fuels such as coal, petroleum and natural gas, and through 
nuclear energy. 
  7537 Alternative Electricity Companies generating and distributing electricity from a renewable 
source. Includes companies that produce solar, water, wind and 
geothermal electricity. 
7570 Gas, Water & Multi-
utilities 
7573 Gas Distribution Distributors of gas to end users. Excludes providers of natural gas as a 
commodity, which are classified under the Oil & Gas industry. 
  7575 Multi-utilities Utility companies with significant presence in more than one utility. 
  7577 Water Companies providing water to end users, including water treatment 
plants. 
8350 Banks 8355 Banks Banks providing a broad range of financial services, including retail 
banking, loans and money transmissions. 
8530 Nonlife Insurance 8532 Full Line Insurance Insurance companies with life, health, property & casualty and 
reinsurance interests, no one of which predominates. 
  8534 Insurance Brokers Insurance brokers and agencies. 
  8536 Property & Casualty Insurance Companies engaged principally in accident, fire, automotive, marine, 
malpractice and other classes of nonlife insurance. 
  8538 Reinsurance Companies engaged principally in reinsurance. 
8570 Life Insurance 8575 Life Insurance Companies engaged principally in life and health insurance. 
8630 Real Estate Investment & 
Services 
8633 Real Estate Holding & 
Development 
Companies that invest directly or indirectly in real estate through 
development, investment or ownership. Excludes real estate 
investment trusts and similar entities, which are classified as Real 
Estate Investment Trusts. 
  8637 Real Estate Services Companies that provide services to real estate companies but do not 
own the properties themselves. Includes agencies, brokers, leasing 
companies, management companies and advisory services. Excludes 
real estate investment trusts and similar entities, which are classified as 
Real Estate Investment Trusts. 
8670 Real Estate Investment 
Trusts 
8671 Industrial & Office REITs Real estate investment trusts or corporations (REITs) or listed property 
trusts (LPTs) that primarily invest in office, industrial and flex 
properties. 
  8672 Retail REITs Real estate investment trusts or corporations (REITs) or listed property 
trusts (LPTs) that primarily invest in retail properties. Includes malls, 
shopping centers, strip centers and factory outlets. 
  8673 Residential REITs Real estate investment trusts or corporations (REITs) or listed property 
trusts (LPTs) that primarily invest in residential home properties. 
Includes apartment buildings and residential communities. 
  8674 Diversified REITs Real estate investment trusts or corporations (REITs) or listed property 
trusts (LPTs) that invest in a variety of property types without a 
concentration on any single type. 
  8675 Specialty REITs Real estate investment trusts or corporations (REITs) or listed property 
trusts (LPTs) that invest in self-storage properties, properties in the 
health care industry such as hospitals, assisted living facilities and 
health care laboratories, and other specialized properties such as auto 
dealership facilities, timber properties and net lease properties. 
  8676 Mortgage REITs Real estate investment trusts or corporations (REITs) or listed property 
trusts (LPTs) that are directly involved in lending money to real estate 
owners and operators or indirectly through the purchase of mortgages 
or mortgage backed securities. 
  8677 Hotel & Lodging REITs Real estate investment trusts or corporations (REITs) or listed property 
trusts (LPTs) that primarily invest in hotels or lodging properties. 
8770 Financial Services 8771 Asset Managers Companies that provide custodial, trustee and other related fiduciary 
services. Includes mutual fund management companies.  
  8773 Consumer Finance Credit card companies and providers of personal finance services such 
as personal loans and check cashing companies. 
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  8775 Specialty Finance Companies engaged in financial activities not specified elsewhere. 
Includes companies not classified under Equity Investment 
Instruments or Nonequity Investment Instruments engaged primarily 
in owning stakes in a diversified range of companies. 
  8777 Investment Services Companies providing a range of specialized financial services, 
including securities brokers and dealers, online brokers and security or 
commodity exchanges. 
  8779 Mortgage Finance Companies that provide mortgages, mortgage insurance and other 
related services. 
8980 Equity Investment 
Instruments 
8985 Equity Investment Instruments Corporate closed-ended investment entities identified under 
distinguishing legislation, such as investment trusts and venture capital 
trusts. 
8990 Non-equity Investment 
Instruments 
8995 Non-equity Investment 
Instruments 
Non-corporate, open-ended investment instruments such as open-
ended investment companies and funds, unit trusts, ETFs and currency 
funds and split capital trusts. 
9530 Software & Computer 
Services 
9533 Computer Services Companies that provide consulting services to other businesses 
relating to information technology. Includes providers of computer-
system design, systems integration, network and systems operations, 
data management and storage, repair services and technical support. 
  9535 Internet Companies providing Internet-related services, such as Internet access 
providers and search engines and providers of Web site design, Web 
hosting, domain-name registration and e-mail services. 
  9537 Software Publishers and distributors of computer software for home or corporate 
use. Excludes computer game producers, which are classified under 
Toys. 
9570 Technology Hardware & 
Equipment 
9572 Computer Hardware Manufacturers and distributors of computers, servers, mainframes, 
workstations and other computer hardware and subsystems, such as 
mass-storage drives, mice, keyboards and printers.  
  9574 Electronic Office Equipment Manufacturers and distributors of electronic office equipment, 
including photocopiers and fax machines.  
  9576 Semiconductors Producers and distributors of semiconductors and other integrated 
chips, including other products related to the semiconductor industry, 
such as semiconductor capital equipment and motherboards. Excludes 
makers of printed circuit boards, which are classified under Electrical 
Components & Equipment. 
  9578 Telecommunications 
Equipment 
Makers and distributors of high-technology communication products, 
including satellites, mobile telephones, fibres optics, switching 
devices, local and wide-area networks, teleconferencing equipment 
and connectivity devices for computers, including hubs and routers. 
 
Notes: * indicate the sector classification that was used in this thesis 
 
Table 4 – Equity market indexes used in this thesis 
Country Financial Market Financial Index 
   
Finland Helsinki OMX Exchange OMX Helsinki 25 
France Euronext Paris CAC 40 
Italy Borsa Italiana – LSE Group FTSE MIB 40 
Germany Frankfurt Stock Exchange DAX 30 
Sweden Stockholm Stock Exchange OMX Stockholm 30 
United Kingdom London Stock Exchange FTSE 100 
   
 
Source: Datastream 
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Table 5 – Risk free rates for testing Fama and French (1993) model 
Country Financial Market Risk free rate 
   
Finland Helsinki OMX Exchange Finland Treasury Bill 1 Month 
France Euronext Paris France Treasury Bill 1 Month 
Germany Frankfurt Stock Exchange Germany Government Bill 1 Month 
Sweden Stockholm Stock Exchange Sweden Treasury Bill 30 Day 
United Kingdom London Stock Exchange UK Treasury Bill 1 Month  
   
 
Source: Datastream 
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